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The role of people as buyers and eaters of food has changed significantly. From being 
protected by a paternalistic welfare state, people appear to be accorded more freedom and 
responsibility as individuals, where attention is redirected from the state towards market 
relations. Many have asserted that these changes are accompanied by fragmentation, 
individualisation, and privatisation, leading to individual uncertainty and lack of 
confidence. But empirical observations do not always confirm this, distrust is not 
necessarily growing and while responsibilities may change, the state still plays an active 
role. This dissertation explores changing relationships between states and markets, on the 
one hand, and ordinary people in their capacities as consumers and citizens, on the other. 
Do we see the emergence of new forms of regulation of food consumption? If so, what is 
the scope and what are the characteristics? Theories of regulation addressing questions 
about individualisation and self-governance are combined with a conceptualisation of 
consumption as processes of institutionalisation, involving daily routines, the division of 
labour between production and consumption, and the institutional field in which 
consumption is embedded. The analyses focus on the involvement of the state, food 
producers and scientific, first of all nutritional, expertise in regulating consumption, and 
on popular responses. Two periods come out as important, first when the ideas of 
“designing the good life” emerged, giving the state a very particular role in regulating 
food consumption, and, second, when this “designing” is replaced by ideas of choice and 
individual responsibility. One might say that “consumer choice” has become a mode of 
regulation. I use mainly historical studies from Norway to analyse the shifting role of the 
state in regulating food consumption, complemented with population surveys from six 
European countries to study how modernisation processes are associated with trust. 
The studies find that changing regulation is not only a question of societal or state vs 
individual responsibilities. Degrees of organisation and formalisation are important as 
well. While increasing organisation may represent discipline and abuses of power 
(including exploitation of consumer loyalty), organisation can also, to the consumer, 
provide higher predictability, systems to deal with malfeasance, and efficiency which may 
provide conditions for acting. The welfare state and the neo-liberal state have very 
different types of solutions. The welfare state solution is based on (national) 
egalitarianism, paternalism and discipline (of the market as well as households). Such 
solutions are still prominent in Norway. Individualisation and self-regulation may 
represent a regulatory response not only to a declining legitimacy of this kind of 
interventionism, but also increasing organisational complexity. This is reflected in large-
scale re-regulation of markets as well as in relationships with households and consumers. 
Individualisation of responsibility is to the consumer not a matter of the number of choices 
that are presented on the shelves, but how choice as a form of consumer based 
involvement is institutionalised. It is recognition of people as “end-consumers”, as social 
actors, with systems of empowerment politically as well as via the provisioning system. 
‘Consumer choice’ as a regulatory strategy includes not only communicative efforts to 
make people into “choosing consumers”, but also the provision of institutions which 
recognise consumer interests and agency. When this is lacking we find distrust as 
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representing powerlessness. Individual responsibility-taking represents agency and is not 
always a matter of loyal support to shared goals, but involves protest and creativity. More 
informal (‘communitarian’) innovations may be an indication of that, where self-
realisation is intimately combined with responsibility for social problems. But as solutions 
to counteract existing imbalances of power in the food market the impacts of such 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Controversies and paradoxes 
Over the last decade, Europe has experienced major crises and wide-reaching regulatory 
change within the area of food. Parallel to shifts in the role of the state, food provisioning 
systems have undergone significant transformations. Technological innovation, market 
integration, and globalisation have produced large and complex systems that challenge 
established social relations and normative expectations.  The growing size and complexity 
have made mistakes and mishaps a much bigger issue since potential economic and 
societal consequences may be so extensive. The role of people as buyers and eaters of 
food has changed significantly. From being protected by a paternalistic welfare state, 
people appear to be accorded more freedom and responsibility as individuals. The notion 
of ‘consumer choice’ redirects attention from the state towards market relations. 
Expectations as well as discontent are referred to market based channels, while state 
regulation of citizens is attributed a less central function. At the same time, there is a 
cultural shift, where consumerism works with neo-liberalism, instructing citizens that they 
can reinvent themselves continually through the process of consumption. The shifts are 
perceived as problematic. Somewhat paradoxically, technocrats and marketing people 
seem to share with system critics an understanding of ongoing changes in consumption as 
characterised by fragmentation, individualisation, and privatisation, leading to individual 
uncertainty and lack of confidence. 
 
How does this fit with empirical observations within the area of food? In spite of 
considerable change, the food market seems neither successfully self-regulatory nor 
producing evermore distrust. The focus on risks has contributed to rapidly growing market 
concerns for predictability and accountability, as represented by standardisation, quality 
assurance, traceability schemes, and external audits. Even though we may now see shifting 
responsibilities, the state still plays an active role. Several have suggested the emergence 
of a new function of the state, a ‘regulatory state’. Considering the wider selection of 
goods, the speed of innovation, media ‘scares’ – and a new role of the state, people’s 
responses are often rather stoic (Trentmann 2007, 150).  
 
My interest is in how changing interrelationships between states and markets, on the one 
hand, and ordinary people in their capacities as consumers and citizens, on the other, 
impact on the regulation of food consumption. My question is not primarily directed 
towards connections between consumption and citizenship. Instead, I want to explore the 
ways in which food consumption is regulated. Do we see the emergence of new forms of 
regulation of food consumption? If so, what is the scope and what are the characteristics? 
And what are people’s responses? I use ‘regulation’ as an encompassing concept, a 
mechanism of intended social control, including a wide range of codified and expressed 
goals or sets of values, brought forth by various agencies, social actors or sets of actors, to 
influence what we eat and how we do it, to monitor these efforts, and attempts to align the 
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controlled variables (Scott 2004, 147). Regulation is associated with power, power to 
make others progress a course of action that they would otherwise not have taken, 
involving broad issues such as the societal distribution of tasks and responsibilities and 
their moral foundations, resources to take action, as well as the concrete decisions that 
people make in their everyday lives. Regulation is characterised by its goals and purposes 
as well as its means, the specific ways of exercising power to reach these goals. But, as 
emphasised by Foucault, Lukes, and others, it is not a unilateral issue. Regulation may or 
may not imply consent by these subjects and their resistance and creativity is a central 
issue (Lazzarato 2002; Lukes 2005).  
 
It has been suggested that paternalistic state regulation referring to conflicts over the 
distribution of material goods and class inequality are giving way to deregulation, 
individualisation, marketization, and conflicts over the distribution of risks (Beck 1992, 
1999; Beck et al. 2003; Ungar 2001; Leach et al. 2005). Along similar lines, guiding 
citizens to good manners by using control (or disciplining) strategies is assumed to be 
replaced by a focus on multiple lifestyle choices as a private matter and with market 
freedom and consumer choice as dominant values (Sulkunen et al. 2004; Neumann 2003). 
As part of this process, many believe that consumption has changed from being a 
collective to becoming a predominantly private relation (Døving 2003; Cohen 2003). 
Underlying (or following from) the focus on ‘consumer choice’ is an assumption that 
consumers cannot be managed in any other way than through (cognitive) encouragement 
of self governance (which may be judged optimistically or pessimistically) (Halkier 2001, 
2004).  
 
In my opinion, regulation via a freedom of choice needs to be critically investigated. I 
agree that recent decades have represented a shift in the regulation of food and food 
consumption from paternalistic and disciplinary state action towards more emphasis on 
self governance and new forms of market based regulation. But commonsense attitudes 
towards a shift in the handling of risk and welfare seem to miss out on major aspects of 
ongoing changes, especially regarding how regulation is embedded in institutionalised 
interrelations. The dilemmas of freedom and structural constraints have received too little 
attention, especially problematic considering that the current focus on consumers is often 
made synonymous with a shift from collectivism towards individualism.  
 
Instead of emphasising only individualisation, fragmentation, openness, and diversity, I 
propose that there are at the same time processes of institutionalisation and formalisation 
which strengthen interrelationships and dependencies between markets, states, and people 
as consumers. Not only may this growing institutionalisation  impact on power relations 
by constituting practical frames of everyday life. The specific ways in which consumption 
is institutionalised will also open up to certain forms of regulation while making others 
more difficult. And these ways will frame and influence expressions of resistance and 
creativity by those who are consuming. This suggests a double movement, of more 
centralised powers (state and market), on the one hand, and of dispersion and dissidence 
on the other. This is particularly significant in the handling of risks, but also as represented 
by the major transfer of labour with food from the family to market and state based 
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solutions. Globalisation may increase diversity, openness and uncertainty, but it may also 
influence food consumption by strengthening interdependencies. It is this combination that 
first of all seems to characterise the contemporary regulation of food consumption. The 
combination of individual responsibility and freedom of choice, on the one hand, and 
growing importance of institutionalised interrelations, on the other, may imply strong 
tensions, politically and for people in their everyday lives. But the combination may also 
be mutually reinforcing, thus providing conditions for particularly strong forms of 
regulation.  
 
In contrast to what is often believed, I claim that the state has not become less relevant in 
contemporary regulation of food consumption and, in relation to this; individual agency is 
in practice neither necessarily bestowed nor appreciated. There are many indications of a 
repoliticisation of food. While food security and prices disappeared as issues of state 
involvement, recent debates on climatic change and soaring food prices have put them 
high on the agenda again. Food safety has received renewed attention as a public 
responsibility, nutritional issues are (re)politicised, and issues like for example quality, 
ethics and organics have raised quests for regulation, including state action. But that does 
not necessarily imply uniform responses or the re-emergence of old solutions. We may 
find cases where strong elements of paternalism and/or repression are retained, but we 
may also find new foundations for providing welfare, risk regulation, and social order. Yet 
other cases may be dominated by controversy and unsettledness regarding such issues. 
Studies of regulation suggest strong path dependencies. It is with this as a backdrop that 
we should search for qualitatively new kinds of institutionalised relationships between 
ordinary people and the state in terms of power, involvement, and responsibilities. 
Throughout history the relationships between food markets, states and individuals have 
been subject to a number of deep, often dramatic, shifts in societal organisation and 
divisions of labour and responsibilities. Food raises major issues of the distribution of 
welfare and risks and of social concerns, of economic power, justice, cultural values, 
animal welfare, and environmental issues. All of these aspects may give rise to 
controversy as well as regulatory efforts with regard to the procurement and intake of 
food.  
 
The argument can be summarised into three points. First, ongoing modernisation 
processes do not necessarily imply less regulation of food consumption. I propose instead 
tendencies to the contrary. But the forms of regulation seem to shift towards more 
emphasis on self-governance. More specifically, while there may be a move from state 
disciplinary actions towards more responsibility (and freedom) allocated to the private 
individual, state authority does not lose its importance. Second, I suggest that these new 
forms of regulation are deeply embedded in increasingly organised forms of interaction, 
not only with the state, but as much with market actors. Third, I argue that modernisation 
implying changing relationships and responsibilities are not antithetical to trust. Nor does 
it make trust redundant. Moreover, rather than reflecting just individual uncertainty and 
powerlessness, expressions of distrust and lack of ‘compliance’ may also represent active 
resistance or creativity regarding food procurement and consumption. The nation-state and 
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a paternalistic regulatory system is not the only way to guarantee safety and build 
confidence.  
 
The analyses will focus on the involvement of the state, food producers and scientific, first 
of all nutritional, expertise in regulating consumption, and on popular responses. Two 
periods come out as important, first when the ideas of “designing the good life” emerged, 
giving the state a very particular role in regulating food consumption, and, second, when 
this “designing” is replaced by ideas of choice and individual responsibility. Buying and 
eating food are the objects of regulation, but it is not until more recently, in this second 
shift, that people, in their capacity as ‘consumers’, become (supposedly) active agents in 
this politics of food consumption . In that way, one might say that “consumer choice” has 
become a mode of regulation. The two shifts are characterised not only by specific types 
of state engagement, but of characteristic relationships between states, markets and 
households. I use a comparative approach to study these particular societal conditions in 
terms of institutionalised interrelationships. Trust represents an aspect of such 
interrelations, an aspect that has received attention in the more recent period when 
consumer agency and choice are at the focus of attention. I use mainly historical studies 
from Norway to analyse the first point in the argument, for the second and third points 
complemented with population surveys from six European countries. 
 
1.2 Regulating people: Changing forms of regulation 
Current discussions on the regulation of consumption are dominated by ideas of de-
institutionalisation and a replacement with self-governance, accompanied by reflexivity, 
excessive risk awareness and distrust. This is reinforced by theoretically founded beliefs 
about the decline of the welfare state, about new ways of exercising power, and about 
privatization and market based regulation. These ideas about shifting relationships 
between states, markets and individuals come together in a strong focus on consumers’ 
freedom to choose. While theories about ongoing change may capture important aspects, 
there also seem to be inconsistencies and aspects that are overlooked. The debate seems to 
be caught in an abstract, de-contextualised, ideological conceptualisation of consumption. 
A number of recent theoretical and empirical contributions on consumption suggest that 
current processes are better conceptualised as a re-institutionalisation, not a de-
institutionalisation. Why are there so strong opinions and beliefs that fail to catch these 
trends? My proposed answer is that this debate is not so much about understanding trends 
in consumption, but rather reflects an ideological and political discourse on the regulation 
of consumption. And analytically we need to keep regulatory strategies distinct from 
consumption practices. 
 
The relevant question is therefore whether contemporary regulation of food consumption 
is best characterised by a tremendous shift from actively imposing external codes of 
behaviour to projects that seek to stimulate self-governance? Compared to the large and 
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rapidly growing body of literature on governance involving state and market, there is less 
empirical research about the state’s and other agents’ role in regulating private life, 
addressing questions such as who is expected to be responsible for what, what are the 
responses and influences from those subject to regulation, and what are the consequences 
of shifting responsibilities and modes of regulation (Hunt 1999)? 
 
The focus on lifestyle choices as a private matter and market freedom and consumer 
choice as dominant values represents an ideology of moral management of the self – or, in 
other words, an ethic of not taking a stand on moral issues (Sulkunen, Rantala & Määttä, 
2004). This increasing autonomy of citizens represents a break with what Foucault 
characterised as the pastoral authority of the traditional welfare state (Dean, 1999). 
Pastoral power is a “caring” form of power. The aim is worldly “salvation” in terms of 
health, standard of living, etc. It addresses all individuals during their entire lives and it is 
linked to the production of truth, truth about the population and the individual (Foucault 
1982). The Nordic welfare states would be a prominent and far-reaching example of such 
pastoral authority, developed into a stable and consensual political culture of negotiated 
interests, moral guidance, and strong norms of universality.  
 
In some sense this is not counter to individualism, as the welfare state was 
characteristically an arena for developing social rights, together with the development of 
civil and political rights, which also gave rise to the idea of “consumer rights” (Ilmonen 
and Stø 1997). But over the last decades, interest has been redirected from state protected 
individual citizenship and rights to calls for self-responsibility and social and parenting 
skills. Attention has been turned away from direct regulation in a state-citizen relationship 
towards indirect regulation and (implicit or explicit) emphasis on the consumer-market 
relationship, to be promoted also with the support of state initiatives. Consumption 
(understood as ‘consumer choice’) has thus come to form a typical representation of new 
forms of regulation (Hunt 1999). The shifting vocabulary, from ‘people’, ‘housewives’, 
and ‘citizens’ towards ‘consumers’, is pervasive, from environmental issues to animal 
welfare and alcohol (Uusitalo 2005; Blokhuis et al. 2003; Sulkunen et al. 2004). A recent 
edited volume on ‘Understanding consumers of food products’  illustrates the point well 
(Frewer and Van Trijp 2007). The book presents the problem of changing individual food 
choices as a matter of poor understanding of consumer decisions: “There is a need to 
develop more predictive, yet actionable models of consumer choice behaviour that provide 
guidance for enhancing success in behavioural modification efforts; research which is 
relevant to the development of effective health interventions as well as new product 
development.” (Frewer and van Trijp, 2007, 644) Policy-making is a matter of balancing 
consumer needs of protection against risks with the benefits of freedom to choose. 
Techniques are called for which can manage this balancing in ways that recognise 
differences of opinion and to integrate these views into governance practices. This is not 
only a problem for public policy: “Today, the food industry is increasingly being 
confronted with a responsibility for the external effects that purchase and consumption of 
their food products may bring about. [  ] It also means that they take a co-responsibility, 
together with governments and consumer organisations, to ensure that consumers balance 
the overall portfolio of food products they consume.” (op.cit. 647)  
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Yet, the ‘pastoral’ authority of the welfare state is contradicted not only by regulation 
assuming self-interested individualism, but also by communitarian tendencies, focussing 
on the commitment and responsibility of individuals and community institutions, rather 
than individual rights towards the (welfare) state - “a romantic rationalism of individual 
self-regulation” (Dean 1999; Rantala and Sulkunen 2006; Sulkunen et al. 2004; see also 
Trentmann 2006, 18). Community is also emphasised by Rose (1999), but he concentrates 
on what he calls ‘familiarization’ as crucial to the means whereby personal capacities and 
conducts can be socialised, shaped and maximised in a manner which accords with the 
moral and political principles of liberal societies. Hunt (1999, 194) has pointed to some 
paradoxes in this mixture of new and old values, expressed in ‘an ideological re-
traditionalisation’, where new configurations of social values linked to individualisation 
are combined with attempts of reinstating traditional forms of social relations, especially 
expressed in a reinforced focus on ‘family values’. The family is counterpoised to 
bureaucratic paternalism of the welfare state. It is an ideal, romanticised family concept 
that does not recognise former tensions (e.g. related to gender) or the significant ongoing 
changes that are taking place in the family institution. Two aspects of community are 
therefore highlighted, the family and close friends, on the one hand, and wider social 
networks, on the other. But, importantly, the described social relations are based on 
individual responsibilities and voluntary commitment rather than strong social control of a 
more traditional kind. And they are clearly “private” as distinct from state as well as 
corporate arenas. 
 
Do we find such tendencies of ‘romantic rationalism’ in the field of food? While the 
general idea of governmentality assumes connectedness and inter-dependence rather than 
opposition between self-responsibility and family life, the current discourse on food does 
not seem so clear. Ordinary people deal with food in a number of roles and capacities as 
part of everyday life, but discursively these are often strictly compartmentalised. While 
expectations of utilitarian, self-responsible, and rational ‘choice’ dominates the market 
arena, communitarian ideals and commensality of a rather “traditional” or “romantic” kind 
is framing the (strictly domestic) family meal, especially with regard to how this meal is 
referred to in public discourse (Bugge and Døving 2000; Holm 2001; Shapiro 2004).  
 
The ambivalence of rational self-regulation and community (and family) orientation is 
reflected in public nutritional campaigns, expressed as a tension around the ideology of 
health promotion. While many, first of all in the medical profession, state that “Unhealthy 
behaviours result from individual choice, [] so the way to change such behaviours is to 
show people the error of their ways and urge them to act differently”, others express a 
belief in action a the level of community, i.e. a social contract with the entire community 
(Coveney 2000, 21). Importantly, however, Coveney notes a striking similarity between 
the two; in each, the subject , or the collective subject (the community), is required to be 
self-reflexive and self-regulating in order to make ‘proper’ and informed decisions. Such 
connotations are also relevant for the  increasing attention towards “food ethics” (Korthals 
2004; Zwart 2000). Moreover, with explicit communitarian references, “alternative” food 
networks have received significant attention in social scientific research on food and food 
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regulation in recent years. Examples include farmers’ markets’, the Slow Food movement, 
community supported agriculture (CSA), and various organic food initiatives (see eg. 
Pollan 2008; Morgan et al. 2006).  
 
Together, these tendencies seem to represent changes in the regulation of food 
consumption, especially with regard to the agency and social responsibilities accorded to 
people as buyers and eaters of food, assuming a ‘reflective social agent of all social 
conducts and capacities’ (Coveney 2000, 26). Privatisation and individualisation of 
responsibilities may thus develop along with a growing focus on community. With 
expectations of self-responsibility as expressed in the notion of ‘choice’, we see an 
amalgamation of communitarian ideals with individual competence and rational decisions 
(see also Rantala and Sulkunen 2006; Rose 1999).  
 
The discussion of changing forms of regulation has mainly addressed discursive changes. 
This seems too reductionist. There are several problems. It is an approach that seems by its 
very focus to overemphasise the regulation of action via cognitive processes. In contrast to 
Foucault, all meaning should not be reduced to knowledge (or even “tacit knowledge”) 
and the actor is not transparent to herself.  Moreover, people’s agency and freedom should 
not be reduced to a freedom of thought. We need to consider what people do and how that 
is affected by various forms of regulation. What happens at the discursive level is 
important, but an analysis of regulation and power should go beyond that, instead seeing 
them as part of a process of habitualisation and institutionalisation. 
 
1.3 An institutional approach 
The general theoretical debate as well as contributions on food consumption suggests 
shifts in the relationship between buyers and eaters of food, on the one hand, and other 
social institutions, on the other. Everyday practices are generally habitual, taken for 
granted, and not easily (or even misleadingly) verbalised. Changing relationships need to 
recognise discursive and cognitive as well as habitual elements. A considerable 
sociological literature has emerged on consumption in general and food in particular 
characterising such activities in terms of habits, conventions and social practices (see 
below). The institutionalisation perspective helps to bring this discussion to a more 
general, but still concrete, level, in search for patterns of change and difference. It is at this 
level that shifting forms of regulation can be discussed. While the habits and 
interdependencies of everyday food consumption may differ compared to earlier times, 
perhaps involving more individualised eating, that does not reduce the importance of 
studying how consumption is institutionalised and how it is regulated. 
 
Food consumption is not a social institution like the family or the market; it is better 
framed as a set of coordinated practices, in which the practices as well as the overall 
configuration are subject to institutionalisation (Kjærnes et al 2007). It is a set of practices 
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with a certain sequence and division of labour. The focus on habits makes it reasonable to 
start out with eating as a key activity. “If eating is the sum effect of many situated events, 
the sociologically appropriate question is whether there is a social logic to the situations in 
which people find themselves.” (Warde 1997) As a consequence, neither items nor 
situations should be observed separately. Rather, the focus should be on the sequence of 
situations and bundles of items. The items, the materiality of eating, are social products, 
linking to the long chain of processes involved in the production, procurement and 
preparation of food. And all of this takes place within specific contexts or trajectories, 
culturally, politically, and economically (Appadurai 1986; Fine 2002). 
 
These habits and interconnections are not static. Institutions have a history, a genealogy, 
and they evolve and change. At the same time, however, these processes should not be 
“over-socialised” in the sense that they are not deterministic and we need to recognise 
agency as well as individual flexibility. Everyday food habits are neither explicit, 
individual acts of decision-making, as assumed in cognitive approaches, nor are they mere 
unconscious, pre-determined acts (Gronow and Warde 2001). Habits normalize practice. 
They are the ‘way things are done’ (by ‘Us’ if not by ‘Them’). Such “normal” practices 
describe how things are usually done, but also how things should be done. But there may 
be internal differentiation based on competence and commitment. And, evidently, there is 
individual variation. Acting in direct contrast to the “normal” may raise practical 
difficulties as well as social sanctions. But that does not rule out individual freedom. 
“Freedom” develops within the frames of and with reference to institutions. It is not either 
institutionalisation or individual freedom: they are involved in a dynamic where habits are 
constantly reconfirmed, but also modified through individual actions. Different forms of 
institutionalisation will open for different degrees and forms of individual agency and 
flexibility.  
 
So the approach is based on a distinction between social processes involved in everyday 
practices of food consumption and regulatory interventions meant to modify these 
practices. Current debates often seem to conflate these aspects, making a circular 
argument where the freedom and responsibility represented in consumer choice is both a 
condition and a goal of regulatory initiatives. As a particular form of regulation “choice” 
should be contrasted to other forms of regulation, where we can expect the balance 
between different forms to differ depending on time and place. As much as there may be 
accordance between regulation and the ways in which food consumption is 
institutionalised, there may also be tensions and conflicts. Attention is therefore directed 
towards associations between characteristics of regulation and the ways in which food 
consumption is institutionalised, opening for mismatches as well as protest and creativity. 
 
In the next chapter, I outline the theoretical controversy that is suggested in this 
introduction, including a clarification of the ideas of the institutionalisation of 
consumption and regulation as part of institutionalised interrelationships. The next two 
chapters present the empirical studies. The third chapter addresses the regulation of food 
consumption in the Norwegian welfare state and questions the emergence of new forms of 
regulation. This is followed by a closer look at uncertainty and distrust related to food 
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risks across Europe. Finally, from a summarising discussion of the research questions, I 
will draw some more general conclusions. 
19 
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2 The theoretical approach: regulation and 
institutionalisation  
2.1 Power, interrelations and the regulation of food consumption 
What about these notions of consumer freedom and responsibility? Is that just a disguise 
for the dissemination of a neo-liberalist ideology of market power? Based on ideas 
developed by Foucault , Rose has investigated what shifting relationships imply in terms 
of (forms of) power. He suggests that new and very broad forms of regulation and 
authority have developed, characterised as ‘government’, including “all endeavours to 
shape, guide, direct the conduct of others, and the ways in which one might be urged and 
educated to bridle one’s own passions, to control one’s own instincts, to govern oneself” 
(Rose 1999, 3). The notion of ‘governmentality’ implies a certain relationship of 
government to other forms of power, in particular to ‘sovereignty’ and ‘discipline’ (Dean 
1999, 19). Sovereignty is exercised through the juridical and executive arms of the state 
over subjects, while discipline represents power over and through the individual, obtained 
through institutions like schools, hospitals, manufacturing enterprises, etc. Power as 
‘government’, on the other hand, sees living individuals as resources to be fostered, to be 
used and to be optimized (ibid, 29). This is not a question of replacing one form for 
another, but “in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has 
as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of 
security” (Foucault, 1991, 102). 
 
Rose has suggested that government gives the state a less hegemonic role. The challenge 
of liberal political rationalities are committed to the twin projects of respecting the 
autonomy of certain “private” zones, and shaping their conduct in ways conducive to 
particular conceptions of collective and individual well-being. This takes place through 
procedures for shaping and nurturing those domains that were to provide its counterweight 
and limit – ‘governance at a distance’ . The construction of freedom and free persons has 
therefore “come to define the problem space within which contemporary rationalities of 
government compete” (Rose, 1999).  
 
I associate self-governance with the large emphasis on ‘food choice’ or ‘consumer choice’ 
in current food discourses, addressing for example nutrition. The notion of ‘consumer 
choice’ seems to encapsulate a number of different regulatory issues coming together to 
represent a strong re-direction of regulation from protection (in a pastoral sense) towards 
emphasising individual responsibility and freedom (Frewer and Van Trijp 2007). 
Examples are certified labelling programmes, “consumer” education, and communication 
in public and commercial media about concrete lifestyle issues. This may, in turn, be 
linked to neo-liberal winds of de-regulation, privatization and individualisation (Jubas 
2007, 243).  
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Self-governance is defined as a distinctively cognitive process. But governing the mind is 
not the same as governing what people do. We must not overlook that food consumption 
practices may be influenced and regulated in many other ways, including legal and 
bureaucratic means and organisational procedures. The state as well as professional and 
economic actors may still exercise regulatory power over consumption without relying on 
self-governance. ‘Discipline’ may play a significant role, especially since a growing 
proportion of our meals are served in kindergartens, schools, workplaces, hospitals, etc., 
i.e. in places where individual choice is highly confined. It has also been suggested that 
discipline is a useful way of conceptualising how shops and retailing intentionally shape 
our purchases (Dulsrud and Jacobsen 2007; Barrey et al. 2000; Zukin 2004). Shops are 
carefully designed, so as to steer – “edit” (potential) their customers in certain directions. 
This may go beyond limited, commercial aims, such as removing sweets from their usual 
place near the checkout counter to avoid children being overly tempted and removing 
tobacco out of sight altogether. Of major importance for understanding the range of 
regulations of food consumption and issues of power is to redirect attention to include 
what happens with the food, where, by whom, how, and the power relations involved. 
Changes at this level may or may not be in accordance with their representation in public 
discourse.  
 
Foucault characterises underlying power structures as ‘states of domination’,  representing 
the capacity to structure the field of action of the other, to intervene in the domain of the 
other’s possible actions (Lazzarato 2002). These states represent an institutional 
stabilisation of strategic relations, based on the fact that the mobility, the potential 
reversibility and instability of power relations is limited. This non-differentiated 
understanding of power, from which there is no escape, has been criticised for “conveying 
a one-sided, monolithic image of unidirectional control” (Lukes 2005). But, even so, it is 
important to be aware of forms of power that are not overt and explicit; in fact, the most 
efficient ones are those that are not recognised. Power in non-coercive contexts includes a 
‘third dimension’ (in addition to explicit decisions – and non-decisions), namely “securing 
the consent to domination of willing subjects” (Lukes 2005, 109). Social and cultural 
processes will help to produce consent. Food provisioning and consumption involve large 
and highly organised and structured sections of society and “organisation is the 
mobilisation of bias”, as Schattschneider (1975) put it. But they will also produce 
freedom. “[Individuals’] freedom may ... be the fruit of regulation – the outcomes of 
disciplines and controls” (Lukes 2005, 97). This is pointing to important dynamics 
between power and freedom, influenced by explicit regulation and the institutional 
framework that regulation operates within. 
 
Searle (1995, 28) makes a useful distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. 
Regulative rules regulate already existing action via different explicit rules, laws and 
sanctions whereas constitutive rules “create the very possibility of certain activities”. 
Institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules; they are the “rules of the 
game”. People are typically not conscious of these rules and they may also have false 
beliefs about them. Thus, people are developing a set of dispositions that are sensitive and 
responsive to the specific content of those rules which, in turn, develop through collective 
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agreement and acceptance (ibid, 142). This distinction between constitutive and regulative 
rules is a good opening for analysing how food consumption is regulated; a way to capture 
how institutionalisation is by itself regulatory for action and, at the same time, that 
regulative rules are imposed on institutions and institutionalised interrelations. 
Constitutive rules will by nature be internal to institutionalisation processes and generally 
implicit, while regulatory rules are more explicit and (generally) imposed externally. In 
order to understand the character of regulation (i.e. regulative rules) it is important to 
consider the relationship between constitutive and regulative rules, asking how regulatory 
rules emerge, whether there is agreement or tension with the constitutive ones, and the 
powers involved in introducing regulations. Searle indicates that constitutive rules come 
first, with regulative rules being established within the framework formed by these rules. I 
will however put up the question whether regulatory rules may be transformed into 
constitutive ones? If so, would a transition be represented in the form of a crisis or rather a 
gradual habitualisation and normalisation? (see also Hunt 1999, 201).  
 
The distinction between regulative and constitutive rules becomes tricky, but also 
important, when it comes to governmentality forms of regulation. We need to question 
who is regulating whom by which means, in order for people as food consumers to make 
the right ‘choices’? For this to be a matter of freedom, that is to represent some autonomy, 
we must also discuss how that freedom is exercised. The possibility of contesting power is 
hard to recognise in many contributions on governmentality, first of all because “power is 
in our freedom” (Rose 1999). While regulatory initiatives are being recognised, power is 
first of all expressed through self-governance and the free choice. When the empowerment 
of the individual is at the same time reflecting the success of the regulatory agent, how can 
we then catch contestation and resistance? Is for example obesity a regulatory failure, an 
act of resistance – or is it demonstrating that structural constraints make it difficult for 
people to take on personal responsibility, even if they may wish to? Norbert Elias has 
suggested that individualisation and informalisation develop along with growing 
interdependencies and therefore require a higher degree of habitual self-control, not less 
(Salumets 2001, 6). In this view, individual freedom means personal discipline and 
responsibility and those who do not exercise their freedom in a proper way may be 
sanctioned, typically in the form of shame, indignation, etc. However, while self 
governance may in this way represent power over the self; that does not necessarily imply 
power over others (Lukes 2005, 73). We might say that with self governance social 
problems are privatized and individualised. But self governance via active choices may 
also introduce elements of protest, resistance, influence in innovation processes, and 
democratic voice. The power relations involved and the relative impacts of these two 
aspects of individualised responsibilities - as privatisation and as politicisation - need to be 
explored critically and empirically.  
 
Traditionally, two extreme positions have dominated the debate on consumption and 
power (Jensen 1984; Harvey et al. 2001; Fine and Leopold 1993; Fine 2004). The 
conception of the sovereign consumer of neo-classical economics (and some 
postmodernist ideas (McCracken 1988)) is contrasted to the critical position of for 
example Marxist inspired writers, who instead associate consumption with reproduction, 
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mirroring conditions of production and with power relations characterised by alienation, 
fetishisation and false needs. Numerous analyses of food issues have been made within the 
Marxist political economy tradition (like the ‘agri-food’ approach) (Buttel et al. 1990; 
Friedmann and McMichael 1989; see also Murcott and Campbell 2004).Within such a 
perspective, “consumer sovereignty” becomes meaningless because corporate actors will 
socialise consumers to adopt a – for the producers – appropriate behaviour. A sense of 
agency will mean self deception. If we discard the basic assumption reflected in the idea 
of the sovereign, decision-making consumer, we can therefore end up with the 
understanding that people in their capacity as buyers and eaters of food have very little to 
say, apart from the control they may retain within their own domestic sphere (and even 
that is challenged by increasing commodification) (see e.g. Guthman and DuPuis 2006). 
Governmentality would in this view mean manipulation of consumers and disclaiming 
responsibility rather than empowerment. 
 
When addressing market relations, we cannot of course overlook that people as consumers 
encounter well organised and highly resourceful actors who must be expected to 
strategically forward their own interests and aims. However, structural imbalances of 
power should not lead us to look at regulation and power in a unilateral manner; we need 
instead to address this as a separate question. Rather than dismissing or assuming 
consumer agency, we need to problematise it. We need to question the role of consumers 
not only in relation to producers or states (or deflating the two), but in the triangular 
relationships between markets, states and consumers (first of all as households). Consumer 
expectations and responses have been found to be significant in the formation of public 
policies as well as in the development of markets (Cohen 2003; Haastrup et al. 2007; 
Harvey et al. 2001; Dréze and Sen 1989; Tilly 1975; Trentmann 2004). As part of 
questions of power, issues of legitimacy are recurrent and we need at least to ask questions 
about the potentials for people as consumers to be creative and “fight back”.  
 
If we look at contemporary conditions, a number of questions and paradoxes appear. One 
is about ideals of pluralism and individualistic choices confronted with mass producing 
markets that are standardised and carefully assigned to various consumer “segments”. This 
raises the question of what a commodified ”freedom to choose” is and how that is related 
to individual responsibility and the power of self governance (Fine 2002)(Warde, 1997). 
Selecting among varieties of breakfast cereals or readymade dinners can hardly be 
identified as moral choices and empowerment, whether referring to the self or to broader 
social issues. How can regulation by consumer choice regarding health, the treatment of 
farm animals, and environmental sustainability be visualised? How is it realised?  
 
Another paradox is that modern food provisioning seems to represent both growing 
complexity and stronger predictability. While current risks are often being associated with 
processes of de-institutionalisation and individualization, the handling of many food risks 
is becoming increasingly organised. Market complexity and problems of controversial and 
dispersed responsibilities have given way to specific, market-led forms of monitoring and 
control as well as a re-emergence of food issues on the political agenda. This has, among 
other things, opened for a large “audit industry”, itself commercial and with built-in 
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tensions (Power 1997; Shapiro 1987). What we see is a shift towards stronger 
management of food provisioning (Hatanaka et al. 2005). What does this imply for 
regulation by choice, a powerless, distrustful consumer or a confident consumer with 
opportunities? 
 
A third paradox is about the state as an unwanted “nanny” and the state as a significant 
party in ongoing regulatory initiatives. Reference to consumer and food choice is 
pervasive in current food policy making. It is not at all clear whether this is a matter of 
“bringing the state back in” (Skocpol 1985) or “taking the state back out” (Rose and 
Miller 1992). How do new forms of state involvement influence the balance between 
liberalisation and freedom, on the one hand, and securing loyalty and compliance, on the 
other? 
 
Questions of power are complex. We cannot dismiss that people in their capacity as 
consumers may exercise power over others. Yet, it is an open, even dubious, question 
whether individual choice, freedom and agency can curb the tremendous increase in state 
and market organisation and management of the food that is distributed. It is within this 
space for action that governmentality becomes relevant. Many of the issues raised here, 
and especially with regard to the role of consumers and food consumption, appear in 
moral and political discourses about responsibility and the limited ability and legitimacy 
of conventional regulation to counter contemporary problems. It has been suggested that 
where globalised provisioning chains make conditions in production out of reach for the 
nation state in which these products end, consumer action can (Nestle 2002).  
 
We also need to critically consider freedom in terms of power over the self. 
Communitarianism and familism may influence what regulatory efforts can do in terms of 
influencing contemporary eating. New forms of communitarianism seem less associated 
with the private, household context, increasingly with reference to networks, local 
communities etc. These spheres outside direct influence from corporations and states may 
delimit as well as reinforce the potential for or impacts on self-governance.  
2.2 Consumption and institutionalisation processes 
I have pointed to the need to recognise underlying structures, social and technological 
processes within and with reference to which regulatory efforts emerge. How can we 
conceive of consumption in a way that, on the one hand, transcends and problematises the 
rational, decision-making model, and, on the other hand, allows for conflict, agency and 
change? The concept of ‘institution’ fell into disrepute under the Parsonian influence 
because it seemed tautological. Institutions, as defined by shared norms and values, were 
seen as functional, self-serving and consensual. This produces a circular argument where it 
is impossible to discuss for example how they are established, by whom, or how they 
evolve. Behaviour and social system becomes one and the same thing. Durkheim also saw 
institutions as normative in character, as functional regulation of economic relations so 
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that a normal and anomie-free social order could develop in modern capitalism (Beckert 
2002; Scott 2001). Yet, when placed in its original context of the more critical Pragmatist 
theory of habitual action – in opposition to economic ideals of rational action, an 
institutional approach can provide a basis for an analysis of how regulatory change is 
linked to food consumption practices as well as the agency of people as consumers.  
 
Thorstein Veblen (1919/1990) had four basic critiques of economics. These were a 
hedonistic conception of the individual, a calculative conception of rationality, an 
atomistic conception of society, and a false position for causality and teleology in 
explaining individual action and social processes. The problem for Veblen was not the 
postulation of wrong motives for action but the presumption that action needs any motives 
at all. The motives for action do not precede action because they come into the picture in 
the middle of an ongoing action process (Veblen 1990; Samuels 1990). Second, 
calculative rationality is not the paradigm of rationality, but a very special case of 
rationality, corresponding to deductive reasoning where all the information is in the 
premises. Third, people do not act in a vacuum as atomistic individuals but under 
institutional effects. This is where norms come in, not as imperatives, but as inhibiting 
action. As the fourth element of Veblen’s argument, social processes do not form a 
background for discrete choice situations (as in Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’), they are 
ongoing and cumulative processes of causality that do not have any teleology. 
 
Along similar lines, Polanyi argued that individual choices and preferences cannot be 
understood outside the cultural and historical framework in which they are embedded: 
“The instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity and stability; it 
produces a structure with a definite function in society; it shifts the place of the process in 
society, thus adding significance to its history; it centres interest on values, motives and 
policy. [ ] The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, 
economic and non-economic.” (Polanyi 1957, 34) 
 
Several contributions that have emerged under the heading of New Institutionalism are 
anchored in this critique of Homo economicus and its presumptions of calculative 
rationality.  With reference to Veblen and Pragmatist philosophy, there has been a 
renewed interest in habits as the foundation of institutions (Gronow 2005). By 
emphasising habitual action rather than socialisation and internalised norms such 
approaches are less prone to the critique of circularity. Instead of identifying habits with 
actual conduct, they are understood as dispositions or as proclivities to act in a certain way 
in certain situations (Kilpinen 2005). Institutions do not merely constrain individuals’ 
choices but they also “establish the very criteria by which people discover their 
preferences” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Social institutions are produced by the habitual 
action of individuals but the process is twofold: institutions also produce individuals. 
Institutions restrict action, but they also enable it. According to DiMaggio and Powell, this 
argument challenges functional explanations to institutions, as institutions may produce 
efficient as well as inefficient or counteracting solutions to problems of governance.  
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In Pragmatism the question of action comes before questions of knowledge, moral 
valuation etc. – not after them as is the traditional interpretation. And it is not possible to 
speak about anticipation of action without implicating an actual world in which such 
action might occur (Määttänen 2005). Actors need not be conscious of the habits that 
affect their behaviour. But habit is a reasoned routine where the habitual and intellectual 
aspects overlap and interact during the course of action (Kilpinen 2000, 2005). In that 
way, action is not reduced to routine (or the outcome of rational decisions) nor is meaning 
reduced to knowledge or discourse. This distinguishes a habitual understanding of 
institutions from the cultural-cognitive. While for example Berger and Luckmann (1976) 
derive habit from action that is originally conscious, according to this perspective 
conscious action derives from and with reference to habitual action. Action takes place 
within a certain context which is never stable. When the objective situation changes the 
actors have to respond by changing their habitual behaviour. It is first of all in situations of 
crisis that actors become conscious of their habits and they are the places for creativity 
(Swidler 1986; Joas 2006). This gives an interactive view of action and structure, not, as 
suggested by Berger and Luckmann, as expressions of one and the same ontological level.  
 
A process of institutionalisation will arrange actors and individuals in certain ways, fixing 
who is affected and involved, their relationship to each other, their distribution of 
responsibilities, etc. While Parsons identified power with legitimate authority, others see 
power by definition acting against the interest of ordinary people (Lukes 2005). It seems 
more helpful to problematise power as part of the institutionalisation involving varying 
balances between different types of interests. Institutionalisation implies or includes taken 
for granted power structures, integrating certain actors and types of conflicts and making 
others more marginal (Schattschneider 1975). Being based on (some degree of) stability 
and predictability, the institutionalisation will imply particular procedures for handling 
these conflicts. This handling will entail more or less freedom to the people involved, 
depending on their position in relation to these conflicts (gender, age, class distinctions, 
consumption vs production, capital vs labour, etc.). The handling of conflicts is associated 
with mechanisms of legitimisation (and may thus raise issues of trust). Yet, we should be 
wary of an institutional theory that implicitly assumes consensus. Not only may 
individuals depart from common, normalised habits as acts of resistance. The sources of 
change and resistance are just as likely to be found in tensions within institutions as in 
contradictions between them (Friedland and Alford 1991, 255). Institutional change is 
often discussed in terms of destabilisation, but, according to Scott (2001, 200), we also 
need to consider the emergence of a new institutional logics. This implies that we should 
investigate forms as well as degrees or phases of institutionalisation. Re-
institutionalisation means that new habits develop, with a realignment of interests and 
power.  
 
Often, but not always, will institutionalisation mean the emergence of organisations (such 
as businesses, public bodies and households) and formalised interaction with other 
institutions (such as regulatory or contractual arrangements, codified communication, etc.) 
(Scott 2001). Organisation represents not merely the introduction of rules and 
bureaucracy, but also a more general process of rationalisation, i.e. the creation of cultural 
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schemes defining means-ends relationships and standardizing systems of control over 
activities and actors (Scott 2001, 74). This also points to the role of material structures, 
such as location, houses, appliances, technologies, etc. (Latour 1998; Law and Hassard 
1999). Artefacts and technologies represent important carriers of institutional elements, 
introducing inventions but also, once developed and deployed, becoming reified and 
appearing to be part of the objective, structural properties of the situation (Scott 2001, 84). 
At the same time, artefacts and their use are shaped by the institutions in which they 
emerge. New food processing technologies may influence eating habits, but their use and 
success will also depend on how they fit into established habits (Green et al. 2003). 
 
This understanding has consequences for how I analyse the objects of regulation, food 
consumption practices - purchasing and eating, but also, importantly, for how I analyse 
regulation. A focus on everyday habits gives a broader conceptual framework for grasping 
food consumption, not as one monumental, normatively or cognitively defined institution, 
but as configurations of interlinked habits. Habits are socially constructed and situated, 
pre-existing to individual action, with more or less flexibility for individual acts not being 
in accordance with those habits. Agency develops within institutions and institutionalised 
interrelations. Institutions are composed also of relations between actors and they are not 
necessarily dependent on the knowledge of these actors. This approach allows us to study 
regulation without any ‘mind-first’ presumptions, a motivation-action causality, but 
instead seeing regulation as a component of interrelations between institutions and as part 
of processes of institutionalisation. Inspired by Bourdieu’s concept ‘field’, Scott (2001, 
208) introduces the concept of ‘organisational field’. By this, he points to an analytical 
framework that goes beyond specific institutions as identified by organisations or specific 
habits to include questions like relevant actors, institutional logics and governance 
structures that empower and constrain the actions of participants in a delimited social 
sphere. It includes all parties who are meaningfully involved in some collective enterprise. 
This is vital in a field such as food consumption, which is so complex and organised, but 
still often treated as individual or, in recognition of social processes, as private. Since my 
focus is on non-organisational habits, I introduce the concept ‘institutional field’ with 




2.3 Dimensions of institutionality – a model of food consumption 
and regulation  
 
The research problem raised in the introduction is about changing regulation of food 
consumption and assumptions about the character of emerging new forms. Following from 
the discussion in chapter 1 and in this chapter, such changes should be analysed in view of 
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shifts in the character of food consumption habits and in interrelationships between such 
habits and regulation.  
 
Three dimensions of the institutionalisation of food consumption can be distinguished. 
Basic, constitutive rules are to be found in the habits of everyday eating as well as in 
institutionalised interrelationships between production and consumption. Following 
Polanyi’s concern with the relation between economic and non-economic processes, this 
second, relational, dimension may be captured as a matter of social division of labour. The 
third dimension addresses the institutional field. The regulation of food consumption 
practices take place within a certain context of players, interests and institutional logics. 
Some of the players and processes are local, others global, but we need to discuss how 
they come together in a particular configuration in order to understand how things happen 
(McAdam et al. 2001). The third dimension is therefore operationalised mainly in terms of 
the situated character of food consumption.  
 
A whole range of activities may go under the heading of ‘food consumption’. Procurement 
(via purchase or otherwise), storage, preparation (by processing and cooking), serving, 
eating, - and clearing, washing and disposal are closely interlinked, but still specific 
activities, each internally also diverse.  From the point of view of a person “consuming” 
food, purchase may be instrumental to bringing about cooking and eating, but may not be 
the key event. Food, cuisine and eating are proclaimed to lie at the very core of sociality: it 
signifies “togetherness” (Murcott et al. 1992, 115). This is not only about the ritualistic 
character of many meals. At an everyday level, the commensality of eating means that we 
try to coordinate our actions. To Simmel, the sociability of eating is related to the 
refinement of social forms of interaction (Simmel 1994/1957; Gronow 1997). A question 
repeatedly posed is whether traditional meal patterns and meal formats are being disrupted 
(Murcott 1995). Many use the expression grazing (there are also similar versions in other 
languages) to describe a situation where food is eaten in less patterned ways with regard to 
time, place and contents. Dissolution of tradition and individualisation are often presented 
as implying more flexibility and freedom for the individual to choose according to his or 
her tastes and preferences. However, many have also emphasised negative aspects of 
individualisation. By the concept gastro-anomie Fischler refers to a tendency whereby 
cultural norms for what should be eaten when and together with whom disappear; where 
regular meals become increasingly rare and replaced by irregular eating patterns (Fischler 
1988;  see also Mintz 1996; Burnett 1989). Following a collapse of traditional and 
authoritative external rules, the individual faces a splintered, uncertain and confused 
situation, where, in the midst of conflicting advice, the individual is left alone, ill-prepared 
to make decisions about food consumption. 
 
However, increasing individualisation and conventionality need not necessarily be social 
opposites (Gronow & Warde 2001). Observed changes do not necessarily represent de-
institutionalisation. With the growing complexity of modern societies we need both 
flexibility and daily routines. Campbell (1996, 149) contends that life in modern societies 
can at the same time become de-traditionalised and more habitual. This is, at least in part, 
an outcome of the organisation of everyday life, as influenced by demography and family 
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structure as well as work. And it is about resources like competence and income. While 
many who depict dissolution and anomie refer to the shifting character of the food supply 
and to public discourses on food, studies of eating habits do not reflect the same degrees 
of change and disruption. A growing body of empirical research indicates that while the 
symbolic and material characteristics of food may be changing, that does not imply that 
socially coordinated patterns of eating have disappeared (Blake et al. 2007; Mestdag 2005; 
Poulain 2002; Warde and Martens 2000; Bugge and Døving 2000).  
 
This debate about the character of contemporary eating habits is clearly important for the 
analysis of regulation. It puts up to questioning how the social problems being addressed 
by regulatory efforts are being defined. Individualised eating appears to be the problem, 
but at the same time an implicit precondition in many regulatory initiatives focussing on 
choice and on situations in which individual choice is most predominant (Niva 2008, 72). 
The debate also opens for a range of interpretations of how people respond to regulative 
rules of eating, from powerlessness or irrelevance, via loyalty and active support, to 
resistance and creativity. 
 
Change in the institutionalisation of food consumption is also about new divisions of 
labour and new types of interdependencies. Assumptions about the shifting character of 
food consumption often refer to a context of market exchange. But not only is “the target” 
moving, as this exchange takes place at different stages in the transformation of food items 
from singular raw materials to a complex dish served on a plate. Food items have a whole 
‘biography’, with numerous steps, involving different people, technologies, economic 
relations, meanings and expectations, etc. (Kopykoff 1986; Murcott and Campbell 2004). 
Zukin sees production and consumption not as two poles of a commodity chain, but as 
continually interacting processes in a “cultural circuit”, where products both reflect and 
transform consumers’ behaviour (Zukin 2004, 178). A third, more economically and 
institutionally oriented conceptualisation of these processes and interdependencies is as 
‘systems of provision’ (Fine and Leopold 1993; Fine 2002). 
 
The dominant change here is, undoubtedly, the increasing significance of 
commodification. As already described, labour with food is taken over by formal food 
institutions, most of them commercial, a shift promoted by market developments as well 
as higher purchasing power and changes in the character of everyday life. This affects not 
only the economics of the relations. It is a massive transformation towards organisation, 
integration and rationalisation. It creates identifiable social entities endowed with interests, 
a capacity to act and formalised responsibilities (re Scott 2001). This introduces a whole 
set of questions about regulation, regarding power and responsibilities as well as how 
regulation can influence what people do. New relationships may not merely delimit the 
scope of direct state regulation, but also enhance regulatory efforts initiated by others than 
public authorities and also more indirect forms of state regulation of food consumption. 
 
When food is part of organised procedures, it will also become subject to codification and 
standardisation. Dishes are given titles on restaurant menus and ingredients of 
manufactured food are chemically analysed, categorised and documented, nutritional 
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evaluations helping to sort those categories according to biological needs. The outcomes 
are both convergence and variation. Again, the question of ‘choice’ is central. Mennell 
(1985, 39) suggests a process of “diminishing [social] contrasts and increasing varieties”. 
In response to Mennell, Warde maintains that the contemporary phase of consumer culture 
has become obsessed with variety and choice, tending to obscure underlying continuities 
in food practice (Warde 1987, 179). With the growing importance of large supermarket 
chains, a huge variety of items is offered in the shops. But this variety does not necessarily 
have consequences for substantive patterns of consumption (ibid, 191). While people used 
to buy a few simple raw ingredients to produce a range of dishes at home, this variation 
has, at least in some respects, been transformed into product varieties in the shops Indeed, 
“increasing varieties” may be as much a phenomenon that is discursively staged by certain 
producers of knowledge, most notably the marketing profession (Lien 1997), rather than 
giving a good description of consumption practices. In any case, self regulation in the 
form of ‘consumer choice’ seems to be based on this commodified and rationalised 
exchange of a variety of goods that are highly processed, categorised and labelled. 
 
Rather than emphasising the impact of variety, Zukin (2004) focuses on the openness that 
choice introduces: “In as much as choice amongst commodities has been found to be 
important, it is not the range of commodities that matters, but the exploitation of choice 
for extending our ability to negotiate the ambivalences and anxieties of relationships” 
(ibid, 154). The openness may however go both ways, from the point of view of buyers as 
well as sellers. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, it is this openness, combined with increasing 
dependencies, that seems to raise issues of trust. 
 
It has been argued that modern food institutions are characterised by their dynamism, the 
degree to which they undercut traditional habits and customs, and their global impact. 
There has been an ongoing debate about how globalised trade, travel and cultural 
exchange produce more homogeneous patterns of food consumption, as represented by for 
example Georg Ritzer’s (1993) thesis about ‘MacDonaldization’. But the transformation 
of the retail sector has been very diverse across Europe, with highly varying degrees of 
supermarket dominance as well as significant differences in the structure of the 
supermarkets (logistics and integration, size, selection of products and marketing 
strategies, proportion of fresh foods, place/distance, etc.) (Kjærnes et al. 2007). While 
shifts in food production and consumption may represent new divisions of labour and 
changing norms and organisation, they still take place within specific locations (Jubas 
2007, 246). There are path-dependencies and considerable unevenness. It is important to 
see how the various aspects come together in specific institutional fields in order to 
understand regulatory aspects as well as their impacts on food consumption practices. Yet, 
the institutional field is not merely characterised by the specific places in which 
production and consumption take place and the links between them (‘where’). The 
institutional field is also matter of ‘who’, of which types of actors and institutions that are 
involved and how they relate to each other. This allows us to move beyond an 
essentialisation of place, which is not very productive analytically, to analyse how such 
differences are produced within specific institutional fields, involving local and national as 
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well as international actors and relations. These fields may moreover differ significantly 
depending on the food issue in question. 
 
Figure 1 summarises the elements of my analysis of modes of regulation and links to 
consumption, captured as an institutionalisation of food consumption. It outlines a model 
which emphasises interrelationships and interdependencies. The circle represents the 
institutionalisation of food consumption, as characterised by three dimensions; everyday 
habits, the division of labour and the institutional field. Everyday habits are characterised 
by the organisation of food consumption practices, their embedded meanings and social 
and normative significance. The focus is on what people usually do. In the end, it is these 
habits that are to be influenced by regulation. But the formation of habits is difficult to 
understand without considering how they are part of a dynamic and a division of labour 
between provisioning and consumption, affecting not only what people do, but also the 
scope of regulation. Moreover, the regulation of food issues takes place within a specific 
institutional field which influences how habits and the division of labour relate to and 
interact with regulation. The double arrow between food provisioning and the mode of 
regulation is an indication of the dynamic between the two. Change taking place in the 
relationship between provisioning and regulation will impact on the institutionalisation of 
food consumption as well as how it is regulated. But the main point of this model and its 
triangular form is to emphasise that such impacts are not a matter of structural 
determinism and that food consumption habits are part of the dynamic. These relationships 
work together to produce varying degrees of freedom (freedom from and freedom to), 
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Figure 1. Regulating food consumption – a model
Notably, this model refers to (aggregate) activities rather than groups of people or
organisations, such as households, markets and states. I address how these activities are 
institutionalised and interrelated without any presumptions about how, where and by 
whom they are carried out. Mostly, food consumption is associated with households, 
provisioning with markets, and regulation with the state. But, as the historical as well as
current references indicate, this is not necessarily so and the interrelationships are highly 
dynamic in terms of the division of labour and responsibilities. The institutionalisation of 
food consumption represents, together with provisioning systems, configurations specific 
in time and space.
This model opens for refining the questions I posed about current types of regulation of 
food consumption. First, the issue of regulatory change can move beyond public discourse 
to address is association with actual transformations in the institutionalisation of food
consumption. Second, as changes in the various dimensions of the institutionalisation of 
food consumption may coincide, reinforce, or instead counteract each other, there may be
matches or tensions which may help to explain responses of trust and distrust. Third, it 
opens for a possible diversity of emergent, new types of regulation. Self governance in the 
form of consumer choice may not be the sole or even predominant solution and it may
take different forms, depending on power, agency, and organisation. Increasing 
interdependencies with regard to food provisioning may open for disciplinary techniques 
becoming more important. But discipline within a neo-liberal context may be quite 
different from strategies developed within the frames of a pastoral welfare state. And the 
extensive expansion and complexity of the organisation of food provisioning represents a 
formalisation which may imply (much) more use of bureaucratic forms of regulation. But 
it is again a question how that appears within the general context of a regulatory state and
aims of governance at a distance from political arenas – as opposed to legal regulations
based on specific political decisions. Again, this raises issues of legitimacy and trust.
33
Yet, the model represents a strong simplification of how eating patterns are formed and 
how they change. The model is meant to operationalise how we can theoretically and 
empirically capture changing interrelations between food consumption/consumers and 
various types of regulatory interventions. These interrelations are of course not the sole 
source of change and variation in food consumption. Broader social and cultural processes 
as well as individual adaptations are involved. The model as well as the empirical 
investigations must therefore be regarded as one input to these larger questions about 
change. 
 
2.3 Design, methodology and the selection of empirical cases  
The empirical studies forming the basis for this dissertation are selected and presented as 
elements in the theoretical argument about changes taking place in the regulation of food 
consumption. The overall design therefore refers more to this general theoretical and 
conceptual framing than to one investigation or one method of data collection. Discussing 
change and variation in regulatory and market institutions is relatively straightforward. 
But in order to capture new forms of regulation, emphasising consumer self regulation, we 
need to get much closer to consumption habits and people’s opinions in their capacity as 
consumers. The challenge has been to find a way of analysing the character of 
interrelations between regulation and consumption. Instead of going into micro-level types 
of interaction, I have looked for broad patterns within areas that are shaped by more or 
less the same types of interrelations with state and market institutions. The concept of 
institutionalisation helps to bring consumption to a more aggregate level that matches 
descriptions of provisioning and regulatory arrangements. 
 
The chosen approach has been to focus on the country level. The nation state should not 
be essentialised, but serves as an analytical unit. While European food consumption of 
today is clearly shaped by processes taking place at sub-national as well as at super-
national levels, when it comes to regulatory intervention in terms of direct interaction and 
communication, the national level is still dominant. This is also demonstrated by distinct 
national patterns (sometimes homogeneous, sometimes very heterogeneous) regarding 
politics and markets as well as eating habits and public opinions.  
 
I have made use of Norway as a case to study the historical emergence and change of 
welfare state regulation of food consumption. The characteristic Norwegian regulation of 
food consumption, “marrying” agricultural interests with public health concerns, has 
turned out to provide a particularly stable and consensual form of regulation.  
 
A typical feature of institutions is that their constitutive rules are taken for granted. Such 
rules are therefore more easily identified by making systematic comparisons across 
contexts and countries. Cross-country analyses help to analyse how regulations emerge 
within and are conditioned by the (variable) institutionalisation of food consumption. This 
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may be particularly urgent when trying to understand the present situation and the 
emergence of new forms of regulation of food consumption. I have focussed on Western 
Europe. This is a region with many similarities, including food supply as well as 
regulatory frameworks. As such, they therefore share some common references which 
make a comparative discussion of institutional variations meaningful (thus representing a 
“most similar” comparative approach). One should be careful about making too 
generalised statements. We know that Europe as a region is particular in many respects. 
Not only is it a wealthy and powerful corner of the world, defending a Western political 
culture. There are also distinct regulatory traditions and ongoing intensive harmonisation 
processes which unify (Ansell and Vogel 2006). In that way, many discussions will be 
specific to that region, distinctly different from for example Russia (Berg et al. 2005; 
Ganskau 2006). Neither North America nor Australia has experienced the same popular 
and political reactions as in Europe. In order to understand varying and changing forms of 
regulation of food consumption, it would therefore be very useful to extend the 
perspective to include other regions. 
 
A number of different methods of empirical data collection and analysis have been 
employed, including historical sources and documentary analyses, statistics, interviews 
with key players, and interviews with ordinary people, mostly in the form of public 
opinion surveys. The particular methodologies involved in data collection and analyses are 
described in more detail in the publications on the various case studies. 
 
The historical studies in Norway are to a large degree based on an investigation of 
Norwegian nutrition policy. The study was a collaborative project between SIFO and the 
University of Bergen, coordinated by U. Kjærnes, and (initially) funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council. The study addressed the emergence and institutionalisation of nutrition 
policy, its development and implementation, including case studies of particular political 
controversies (milk, margarine). The empirical material included historical archive 
material, interviews with key players, policy papers, and secondary material. While article 
I refers directly to this study, it is in article II complemented with published findings from 
a number of other studies (see references in the article). 
 
The empirical material presented on trust in food has been collected in a project on 
variations in trust in Europe (articles III and V). ‘Consumer Trust in Food. A European 
Study of Social and Institutional Conditions for the Production of Trust’ 
(TRUSTINFOOD) (2002-2004) was funded by the European Commission, 5th 
Framework Programme, Quality of Life, Key Action 1, contract no. QLK1-CT-2001-
00291. The project was coordinated by The National Institute for Consumer Research 
(SIFO) and involved teams at the University of Bologna, The Royal Veterinary and 
Agricultural University and Roskilde University in Denmark, CRIC University of 
Manchester, University of Porto, and the Federal Research Institute for Nutrition and Food 
in Karlsruhe, Germany. As part of the TRUSTINFOOD study, representative population 
surveys were conducted in six European countries, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Norway, and Portugal, along with institutional studies in the same countries and at 
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the European level (Halkier and Holm 2006; Kjærnes et al. 2007; Poppe and Kjærnes 
2003). For further details on the collection of survey data, see article III and V.  
 
The focus on national variations in trust in food has meant that survey data are presented 
mainly in the form of simple univariate distributions (in article III) and one country by 
country multi-variate regression model (in article V). The “social” nature of trust has here 
been investigated by contextualising opinions at an aggregate, national, level. Basically, 
therefore, public opinions have been analysed as one out of several sources of information 
on trust within a country. More detailed statistical analyses of individual variations in 
trust, linked to attitudes and social background factors as well as food consumption 
practices, have been conducted (Kjærnes et al. 2005; Poppe and Kjærnes 2003). These 
analyses do provide additional knowledge about the dynamics of trust and distrust, 
including how the dynamics of high trust than that of high distrust. But the general, 
overriding experience from these analyses is that explanations at the political and 
institutional level are more important than those which can be identified within the survey 
material. On the other hand, the survey has provided crucial information on what people 
do as food consumers (shopping, cooking, eating, protesting), serving as input to analyses 
of the impact of different forms of institutionalisation of food consumption (Kjærnes et al 
2005, Kjærnes et al 2007). 
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3 The regulation of food consumption: from discipline to 
self governance? 
3.1 Modernising eating habits  
Liberalisation and the creation of “free markets” from the 16th century onwards 
represented a major breach with the ‘moral economy’ of the past. Entitlements had been 
based on status and direct relationships between the sovereign and his subjects. While 
these entitlements were dismantled, new ones gradually emerged: “if the rise of a market 
society brought indisputable horrors, it also brought an emphasis on individual freedom of 
choice, the right to self-embetterment, eventually the opportunity to political 
participation.” (Thompson 1971, 272) In the long run, Thompson states, improved 
communications and the formation of national/international markets were advantageous to 
all parties. But dearth and famine are always in the short run and Adam Smith had only 
long-run remedies. Political conflicts were mainly over short-run measures, where he 
advocated more strongly than others the inviolability of laissez-faire (admitting only 
distributing pittance money). Riot marked a transitional phase towards the establishment 
of more efficient national markets regulated by price and police alone (Thompson 1971; 
Tilly 1975). But by the latter part of the 19th century, free market economies and rapid 
industrialisation of agriculture dominated, reducing most states’ food regulation to 
restrictive forms of poverty relief.        
 
The poverty relief distinguished strongly between the deserving and the non-deserving and 
often had explicit disciplinary aims, including what to be eaten (Jones 1986; Dahl 1977). 
At the same time, moral guidance was relegated from the Church to more secular 
institutions, often voluntary, philanthropic ones. Regulatory efforts addressed not only 
individuals, but eventually also the rapidly developing mass markets in the form of 
measures to avoid malpractice, speculation, and health hazards. Disciplining markets was 
a matter of efficiency and “fair” competition. But it was also a matter of social order. A 
wave of riots across Western countries around the last turn of the century addressed the 
unpredictable and hazardous conditions in many food markets (Burnett and Oddy 1994; 
French and Phillips 2000; Hirdman 1983). Regulatory responses did however not contest 
the principle of free market exchange. State regulation of markets and food relief were 
explicitly not to replace market mechanisms but to make them work better.  
 
So while this period of liberalism represents more market and (for the majority) individual 
freedom, we also see the emergence of strong regulatory institutions disciplining markets 
and people . This is most explicitly expressed by the hygiene movement which took hold 
from the last turn of the century (Hennock 2000; Jones 1986; Schmidt and Kristensen 
1986). It was a question of modernising eating and production along lines drawn up by 
sciences like nutrition, microbiology, and epidemiology. Hygienic modernisation was 
widely popular as a way to improve general standards of living (and reduce social 
conflict). Discipline, by itself, points to the expansion of organisations and institutional 
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procedures, embraced by modern capitalists (like entrepreneurial chocolate manufacturers 
in the UK and in Norway) as well as by voluntary organisations. At the same time, the 
family developed from a patriarchal sanctuary towards a space and an instrument for 
building welfare in society. New dependencies formed by the commodification of food 
provisioning both required and opened for more regulation of food consumption. With the 
new discipline of ‘home economics’ the housewife was to be taught how to make efficient 
use of resources, how to become a rational consumer in the modern food market, and to 
serve nutritious food to the family. It is within this scientific, paternalist - clearly 
disciplinary - frame that we see the emergence and institutionalisation of what may be 
called “modern” regulation of food consumption. 
 
But, as in earlier times, liberal politics provide little preparedness for acute shortages of 
food. And food, when there is a loss of entitlements, is closely associated with social order 
(Sen 1982). The shortages in the last years of World War I were met by widespread riots 
of the classical form; with protest marches, but also attacks on profiteering shops and 
looting (Argenbright 1993; Coles 1978; Frieburger 1984; Kjærnes 1997; Koblik 1976; 
Smart 1986). Quite extensive regulatory measures, including price regulation, public 
purchases, and distribution of food in kind, were rapidly put in place , institutions which 
were to have considerable implications for food provisioning and consumption policies of 
the 20th century. Even though there is little uniformity, this represented in many ways the 
end of laissez-faire food policies and a more active role of the state.  
 
It is with this background of conflicts over the distribution of food that we see the 
emergence of welfare state food regulations. Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism is paradigmatic of a vision of the welfare state, in which the relative balance of 
public or private provisioning of goods and services, commodification and de-
commodification, privatisation and nationalisation, have set state and market as essentially 
antagonistic forces, often sustained by contrary ideological perspectives and political 
strategies (Esping-Andersen 1990). Notably, however, de-commodification is 
complementary rather than replacing market based distribution. The legal status of public 
responsibilities related to food and welfare within the frames of a welfare state may take 
different forms (Esping-Andersen 1990, 48). As opposed to means-tested poor relief of the 
liberal state, where eligibility is conditional and where the assistance is characterised by 
restrictiveness, and insurance based systems where rights and benefits may be ample, but 
where access is conditional upon a blend of labour-market attachment and individual 
financial contribution, the third, Scandinavian, type of system aims to actively counteract 
the unequal outcome of market based distribution. It springs from the Beveridge principle 
of universal rights of citizenship, regardless of degree of need or extent of participation in 
the labour market.  
 
Levenstein (1988) has shown how the modernisation of American food habits was 
influenced by a multiplicity of social forces which are not merely characteristic of a 
liberalistic regime, but are strongly affected by particular American interrelations and 
alliances, especially between nutritional science, large food corporations, and regulatory 
authorities. James et al (1997) describe more briefly how European countries differ in 
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rather basic ways in how they handle more or less similar nutritional issues. In a similar 
manner, we can ask how reforms of food regulation appeared in the Scandinavian welfare 
state. On the one hand, it brought new distribution principles, a focus on collective, 
universal goals and an active state. On the other hand, while labour mobilisation was a 
central force, coalition building played a key role as well (Esping-Andersen 1990, 12). A 
broad labour-agrarian alliance formed the basis for a full-employment welfare state in 
return for farm price subsidies (ibid, 30). In the next section I will discuss how these 
different forces and political aims influenced the regulation of food consumption in the 
Norwegian welfare state. 
 
3.2 Designing the good life: the emergence of Norwegian 
nutrition policy (article I)  
From the last decades of the 19th century there was in Northern Europe a growing 
recognition of the shortcomings of a system of Poor Laws advising subsistence measures 
(Burnett 1989, 109). New critique emerged which addressed not only the injustice of the 
system but even its inadequacies in producing a population of high quality, reducing the 
performance of soldiers and workers. The science of nutrition was instrumental in 
replacing a quantitative understanding of hunger as sufficient food (or energy) by “basic 
needs” as a qualitative issue, with requirements of specific food items to produce “a 
balanced diet” that could provide enough energy as well as essential nutrients. The 
emerging science offered scientifically based, “a-political”, decision-making criteria for 
food distribution in a time of growing social tension (Jones 1986). In large countries 
military demands and concern for national safety also helped to bring nutrition onto the 
national political agendas (Mills 1992; Weggemann and Schätz 1995). Thus, hygienically 
framed efforts were attractive to diverse political regimes, like Germany, Great Britain, 
and the Scandinavian countries. They all wanted to discipline the population to improve 
its “quality”. But the specific formulation and implementation differed. 
 
Even in Norway nutrition emerged as a social problem under a liberal regime for 
economic policy, but much wider aims developed during the inter-war period. Compared 
to other European countries the Norwegian labour movement had been strongly focussed 
on class struggle and nutrition became part of radical mobilisation for better welfare; 
nutrition was reformulated from elitist discipline into a liberating project. So what did that 
imply? A study of the emergence of nutrition policy in Norway shows how this goes to the 
core of the political foundations of the Norwegian welfare state, with its very distinctive 
approach to issues of welfare (Jensen and Kjærnes 1997). Three aspects are of particular 
importance: belief in scientifically based state intervention, corporative forms of 




Nutrition became integrated into the "standard of living" concept developed within 
economic welfare theory, which aimed at systematic use of science in defining and solving 
social problems (Wold 1949). Solutions were associated with state responsibility – for the 
large numbers of unemployed, for other groups outside the labour market, as well as the 
many with too low salaries to meet the needs of a household (Nordby 1989, 57). Central to 
Norwegian welfare state food regulation was the extended and unquestioned beliefs in 
state authority and an ‘active’ (in Keynesian terms), benevolent state. The State was to 
have responsibilities concerning economy and production as well as the welfare of the 
population. The political wings met in a belief in rational and scientifically based planning 
as an administrative measure and a way of solving social problems.  
 
The political red-green alliance had a very particular significance for the corporative 
solutions that developed in the food sector. The Labour Party taking over government in 
1935 was based on a political agreement with the Agrarian Party. The new, reformed, 
politics emphasised common interests of urban workers and the rural population 
(smallholders, rural workers). "Town and land - hand in hand" was the slogan. Nutrition 
policy came to materialise directly the new political situation by linking welfare concerns 
of workers to those of rural producers (Rudeng 1989). This was indeed based upon 
concrete experiences of insufficient national supplies during World War I. But the agenda 
rapidly exceeded this reference to war and crisis, aiming at maximum self-sufficiency on a 
more permanent basis.  A “national diet” agenda can be found at one time or another in 
many countries, but the long lasting significance of this "patriotic" policy for nutrition 
policy seems rather unique to Norway, as part of a liberating, nation-building project. The 
very strong and propagandistic slogan of a "marriage between health and agriculture", 
saluted even in international forums like The League of Nations, laid the foundations for 
broad consensus: "The question of nutrition has two aspects, the economic and the 
hygienic, or in other words: it concerns on the one hand the production and distribution of 
food, on the other hand the maintenance and promotion of the health of the people (Det 
Norske 1937, 3). Paradoxically, as part of this process, attention was redirected from 
redistribution and social policy towards economic growth and production. 
 
Together, scientific planning and patriotic corporatism signalled a long period of strong 
interventionist - and protectionist - policies in the food sector. The focal point was that 
large sections of the population "needed" a higher intake of “protective” foods. Several of 
these were the very same that were produced in larger quantities than the farmers could 
sell: milk and butter. Yet, when the population’s "needs" for these protective foods were 
calculated, the conclusion was undersupply. Like housing problems, nutrition represented 
material needs that could increase production and thus benefit the national economy. The 
administrative solution to these challenges was in the coordinated efforts of experts and 
political interest groups, through planning committees and negotiating bodies. A national 
nutrition council was soon established with representatives from all "concerned parties", 
i.e. nutrition and economic experts, administrators and producers – and no 
citizens/consumers. Their task was mainly directed towards policy advice and planning. 
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This centralised multi-sectorial state regulation implied special forms of interrelations and 
moral considerations, where nutritional concerns became interwoven with other concerns 
of strong national importance, such as economic support to agricultural production and 
rural communities and reduced social inequality. Scientific, and especially nutritional, 
experts played a central role in forming policies that addressed welfare issues without 
challenging political coalitions (between the labour movement and the farmers). 
Modernisation within and with reference to these particular forms of institutionalisation 
provided powerful solutions and legitimacy, but also significant tensions and limitations. 
While nutrition was co-opted by strong interests, the alliance and its political foundation 
also implied strong legitimacy of health and nutrition issues. Nutrition was a social 
problem to be solved by political means, not a private, individual problem. Moreover, 
unlike liberal policies nutrition policy addressed the whole population in a collective and 
universal enterprise, not particular groups, like the most vulnerable or groups of particular 
importance. 
 
This case emphasises the importance of historical legacy and institutional path-
dependency for understanding how regulations of food consumption evolve and become 
institutionalised, in Norway closely linked to nation building during the first half of the 
20th century. Second, this was facilitated and maintained by strong legitimacy from 
powerful groups and political alliances, in particular the alliance between the labour 
movement and the farmers. Consumers became politically completely marginalised. 
Rights to protection dominate over private freedoms or responsibilities, with little 
hesitation over state regulation of markets and the family sphere for “the common good”. 
But, third, the welfare state also represented strong moral regulation, where discipline was 
associated with goals of universal welfare. The question is then how these aspects have 
impacted on current regulation of food consumption. 
3.3 Discipline, choice and the institutionalisation of food 
consumption (article II) 
There is a widespread assumption that the welfare state as a moral project has lost its 
legitimacy and has more or less disappeared. In scientific papers as well as in political 
rhetoric this moral project is framed as old fashioned and paternalistic. I argue, however, 
that the moral role of the state in creating “a good life” – in its social democratic version – 
has had widespread support and that its legacy is not necessarily total condemnation. 
Importantly, this paternalistic regulation has had strong and lasting impacts beyond direct 
policy-making. It reformed the institutionalisation of food consumption in Norway in 
crucial ways, affecting also how Norwegians now encounter new problems and new 
regulatory initiatives. 
 
The Norwegian packed lunch with open sandwiches has an interesting and special history 
which shows complex interactions between regulatory initiatives and processes of 
institutionalisation of food consumption in the welfare state (Kjærnes and Døving 
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forthcoming). “The Oslo breakfast” was established in the inter-war period as a reformed 
school meal. Introduced by hygiene oriented medical reformers, the meal was explicitly 
designed according to scientific conceptions of needs, considering even national 
provisioning and educational effects. Many Norwegian municipalities were almost broke 
at the time, leaving little space for costly reforms. Thus, the ‘matpakke’ was invented; a 
packed ‘Oslo breakfast’ to be brought from home. Not only would that save money, it 
would also educate the homes. The idea of a ‘matpakke’ was not totally unknown, but the 
fixed contents was; open sandwiches with wholegrain bread, margarine, and a thin topping 
of cheese, salami or liver paste, accompanied by raw vegetables or fruit, with whole milk 
to drink. The effort was highly disciplinary, including monitoring of the children’s lunch 
boxes. Switching from a meal served in school to a packed lunch effectively extended the 
‘inspecting gaze’ (Lukes 2005, 100) to their mothers and families at home. 
 
The ‘matpakke’ was a school reform initiated by the medical elite and supported by 
agrarian interests, but it was received as a popular modernisation project to the benefit of 
the people. It came to represent an improvement, rather than a break with ongoing changes 
in food consumption associated with processes of industrialisation and urbanisation. Its 
organisation reflected a dominant contemporary division of labour, where families (i.e. the 
housewife and the mother) were to provide nutritious meals, making careful use of 
incomes and food resources. The guidance did not open for flexibility or questions of 
individual freedom. And the puritan character of the meal fitted well into the Norwegian 
work ethic of moderation and personal discipline. But the political framing of this project 
seems to be an important reason why it was so well received and also why the success was 
so large. It came to represent one element of designing the good life - for all. 
  
Yet, the long-term effects on eating habits cannot be explained only by its political 
popularity at the time. The fervour with which it was implemented had deep effects on 
Norwegian eating habits via its function as a socialisation project as well as through its 
implications for the organisation of eating during the day, in schools and eventually in 
work places – and at home. It intervened directly with the institutionalisation of food 
consumption. The 2-3 slices of bread wrapped in paper, prepared at home and eaten at 
lunch time in a canteen or at school, is thus an example of a regulative rule which via 
processes of institutionalisation has developed into a constitutive rule. Normatively, it has 
turned into the “proper” lunch, wrapped in an egalitarian and national spirit and sanctioned 
by condemnation and exclusion. Even if you do want to oppose by having a different 
lunch, practical opportunities to do so are few. The strong normative and political support, 
combined with organisational implications, may contribute to explain why this lunch 
institution is so strong today, in spite of contemporary Norwegian’s affluence, new 
nutritional recommendations, cultural exchange, and changes in food retailing. The links 
between regulation and institutional frames are relatively easy to describe, with 
accordance between normative expectations related to food and eating, the modernisation 
of family life via welfare state policies, and the structure of food provisioning.  
 
However, the very same interrelations became a problem when the nutritional agenda in 
the 1960s and 70s was completely redefined from insufficiency to “over-nutrition”, 
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especially of saturated fat. Sugar eventually also entered the over-nutrition agenda in 
relation to diabetes and obesity. The focus was redirected from healthy food items (like 
milk) towards nutrients and nutrient composition. Referring to an American discourse it 
has been suggested that this redirection of attention is associated with more emphasis on 
individual flexibility and choice (Pollan 2008). These problems also emerged in a period 
when disciplinary initiatives were gradually becoming out of date, not the least because 
their main targets, the housewives, were disappearing into the labour force. So does this 
imply a general shift towards more self-governance even in Norway? The answer is not 
simple. In spite of apparent similarities between sugar and fat, their regulation turned out 
to become quite different.  
 
The problems of fat were being linked to dairy fat, meat and margarine, at that time the 
major sources of fat. The most significant and politically supported sectors of food 
production were affected. The new dietary recommendations turned the nutritional value 
of formerly highly appreciated and subsidised food items, like whole milk and butter, 
upside down. The welfare state had produced a large problem for the wellbeing of the 
population. The new approaches thus opened for considerable opposition and conflict. 
But, and this is the surprising observation, the welfare state had produced institutions 
which formed a basis, a point of departure, for reformulating and reorganising regulatory 
efforts to address the new problems. This includes policymaking bodies like the National 
Nutrition Council as well eating habits like the packed lunch. One might critically say that 
the eventual reformulated policy is an example of cooptation and the new regulatory 
efforts were in fact rather defensive. But new dietary goals were legitimised and the 
promotion of animal fat was – little by little – removed. After years of public and expert 
criticism, the dairy industry eventually decided to offer a low-fat variety of milk – which 
people welcomed with great enthusiasm (Kjærnes 1995). New educational campaigns 
were launched of a (slightly) more open and individualised kind: advice suggesting fat-
reducing modifications of established meal conventions (Haavet 1996). The “national 
menu” was revised, not dismantled. Fat did re-politicise food, but the critique was soon to 
be recaptured by a producer dominated agenda along established alignments of the welfare 
state: welfare for people and for the farmers. 
 
Sugar represented almost none of this. Sugar has never been associated with major 
agricultural interests in Norway and has no position in the welfare state. Chocolate and 
soft drink manufacturers have been concerned with freedom from state intervention (esp. 
taxation) rather than protection. They have concentrated on competition and marketing of 
products for “new consumers” - individualistic and pleasure seeking (Rudeng 1989). The 
disciplined everyday meals of modern Norwegians contain little sugar, which is mostly 
relegated to the leisure sphere, with freedom, pleasure and few rules as key characteristics.  
This private sphere of freedom is not easily addressed by traditional moral regulation or 
corporative intermingling with the agricultural industry. And the political “story” is 
weaker. Even though there are Norwegian bad guys, “sugar pushers”, in this story, these 
are hardly visible in public discourse. Mobilisation has mainly focussed on multinational 
corporations – with little capability of politicising sugar within the Norwegian context. 
Within such frames of freedom we might expect to see the emergence of consumer self-
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governance, considering the generally high concern about and knowledge of nutrition in 
the Norwegian population. There are certainly also educational efforts pointing in that 
direction. Hardly any Norwegian is unaware of the advice to cut down on sugar. But the 
success is meagre. People eat less fat, but more sugar. For sugar we can see that eating 
habits and institutional fields play together in producing an area of consumption that is not 
easily and effectively targeted by regulatory intervention. 
 
The strong position of the packed lunch and the sharp contrast between fat and sugar are 
surprising not merely in relation to regulation, but even in consideration of the social 
effects of changes in time use, the increasing provision of leisure services (e.g. restaurants) 
as well as global changes in consumer culture. The reasons are surely complex. I have 
pointed to some explanations linked to distinctive aspects of the Norwegian 
institutionalisation of food consumption and how that is interlinked with regulatory 
initiatives. 
 
The assumption that self regulation is associated with de-institutionalisation in terms of 
deregulation of public policies as well as eating is supported here if self regulation is 
regarded as a default outcome of neo-liberalism and non-intervention. But that does not 
seem satisfactory if regulation is about influence and power. Norwegians’ responses to 
sugar may as well be regarded as acts of resistance to the disciplinary regulation of the 
welfare state, so successfully implemented in the case of the packed lunch and, later on 
and in a modified and modernised version, with fat. I therefore suggest a dynamic, where 
the regulation of food consumption has powerful effects on what people eat when there is 
accordance between regulations, market institutions, and cultural and normative references 
for everyday habits, and much less - or in unexpected directions - when this is not the 
case. Harmonisation of different societal institutions has been particularly strong in 
Norway because of specific interrelations between households, the food market, and 
regulatory institutions within the welfare state. This configuration has been capable of 
incorporating even new and redefined goals when they fit into the established institutional 
field of nutrition. But outside such institutional fields Norwegians can and do exercise 
their individual freedoms. The discourse on regulation has changed but it is a question 
about whether we observe a real shift in Norway towards self regulation and self 
responsibility with regard to nutrition. 
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4 Consumer choice: risk and trust 
The regulation of food hazards goes way back in history. Food safety has typically been 
part of public health policies, but has also represented an integrated element of regulatory 
policies for civilizing markets (Ansell and Vogel 2006; French and Phillips 2000; Quirk 
1980). The safety of marketed food is, along with fraud, difficult to control at the point of 
purchase and has repeatedly provoked reactions among ordinary people. Regulation seems 
to have been almost a precondition for the marketisation of perishable foods. 
Industrialisation and urbanisation brought new challenges to food safety – and to food 
regulations, to a large degree paralleling those that have been described above. But unlike 
the regulation of the diet, food safety regulations did not attain a fundamentally different 
character with the emergence of the welfare state. The main difference was a somewhat 
higher level of ambition with regard to the protection of public health (Elvbakken 1997; 
Kjærnes 1994).  
 
With the extension and globalisation of markets national and local food safety regulations 
were increasingly criticised as, on the one hand, insufficient and, on the other, as obstacles 
to market integration. The regulation of food hazards and risks has been subject to 
extensive re-regulation in Europe (Ansell and Vogel 2006; Halkier and Holm 2006; Smith 
et al. 2004). Many of these changes are in line with broader shifts in regulation over the 
last couples of decades, involving new mechanisms of social ordering. The regulatory 
state represents complex changes in public management, with a separation of functions of 
control from bureaucratic mechanisms towards other instruments. A typical example is the 
“agencification” of regulatory bodies, combined with an emphasis on market 
responsibility and self regulation (Braithwaite 2000; Scott 2004; Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2004; Majone 1996). The re-regulation is closely associated with structural change. 
Vertical as well as horizontal integration in the food provisioning chain, technological and 
logistic innovation, more concentration and power located at the retail level, as well as 
regulatory change towards market responsibility, all add up to wide-ranging shifts in the 
state-market relationship and in market interrelations with households and consumers 
(Dulsrud 1996; Harvey et al. 2003; Marsden et al. 2000). Extensive quality assurance 
schemes address issues of predictability and liability. But, increasingly, they have also 
become important instruments for market differentiation, communicated to consumers via 
product labels, market segmentation strategies, and retailer branding. “Third parties”, 
serving crucial functions as auditors and certification bodies, include a range of 
“independent” actors, but the state has retained a central role when it comes to food safety 
and the protection of public health (integrating national and supra-national systems).  
 
The major changes in the societal handling of food hazards are often assumed to produce 
uncertainty and risk, supported by food safety questions ranking high on the public and 
political agendas in recent years. This is taken to indicate the emergence of a new, rather 
uncomfortable and distrustful consumer. As such, responses of trust and distrust can 
therefore be analysed as part or expressions of changing interrelationships. I will in the 
following address this issue, asking whether we uniform tendencies of increasing distrust. 
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I will discuss the issue in view of various theoretical debates on trust, asking how helpful 
they are for understanding these observed tendencies. I argue that a relational and 
institutional perspective is not only useful in analyses of the dynamics of trust, but that 
this can be of help in analysing emerging new types of interrelationships and new forms of 
regulation of food consumption. In particular, trust and distrust seem important for 
understanding questions of consumer agency, responsibility and power. 
4.1 Trust and distrust: cognitive decisions or social relations? 
(article III) 
Consumer trust has been a keyword in European debates and policy initiatives on food 
over the last 10-15 years. Numerous academic contributions have attempted to capture 
current public discomfort and unrest with regard to food (Kjærnes 2006). In asking why 
people react as they do, cognitive approaches have come to dominate, linking individual 
perceptions of risks to media scares and communication with experts. With reference to 
the vast efforts to improve food safety, experts and policymakers have tended to judge 
consumer unease to be excessive, unwarranted and irrational. The experience that many 
people are not reacting in accordance with experts’ evaluations of risks has been attributed 
to “lay” ignorance. Numerous studies have analysed people’s reactions to technological 
hazards and media crises, often focussing on new issues such as genetically modified food 
and mad cow disease. Perceptions and probability assessments involved in risk perception 
and risk-taking behaviour are characterised as ‘judgements under uncertainty’ (Hansen et 
al. 2003; Scholderer and Frewer 2003; Slovic 1999; Löfstedt and Frewer 1998). This 
uncertainty is about knowledge and information and the role of trust is as part of 
individual decision-making about risks, where assessments and decisions are seen as 
cognitive processes. The focus on (one-way) information programmes as the remedy has 
been characterised as the ‘knowledge deficit model’ (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003). People 
represent a lay public and individual customers, they are not social actors. 
 
The lack of success of one-way information has led several to suggest deliberative 
approaches, with two-way communication programmes and consumer involvement in 
debates and regulatory decision-making (Slovic 1999, Scholderer & Frewer 2003). Even 
though participatory in nature, these contributions still adhere to the cognitive focus on 
communication. Trust is an individual attitude which, in turn, is assumed to influence 
behaviours, understood as purchasing decisions. Successful information depends on trust 
in its sources (Breakwell 2000; Frewer et al. 1999). But such a cognitive account of trust 
easily becomes tautological: trust is based on trustworthy information and trustworthy 
information is information which is trusted.  
 
This understanding seems to offer little help in understanding current phenomena 
(Kjærnes 2006). As a starting point, I will therefore discuss some observations which 
challenge the dominant current understanding of trust in food and instead direct attention 
towards the importance of social interrelations in the food chain. Looking across European 
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countries, there do not seem to be any direct correlation between the extent of media 
scandals and public opinions of distrust (Bredahl 2001; Böcker and Hanf 2000; Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Renn and Rohrmann 2000). Not only are people more concerned in some 
places than in others, but their responses in the food market after a “media scare” are 
markedly different. As part of the TRUSTINFOOD study (see section 2.4), representative 
population surveys were conducted in six European countries, Denmark, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, Norway, and Portugal, along with institutional studies in the same countries 
and at the European level (Halkier and Holm 2006; Kjærnes et al. 2007; Poppe and 
Kjærnes 2003). The survey findings indicate that, overall, experts tend to be highly trusted 
in terms of truth-telling in case of a food safety scandal. Food authorities and the media 
are neither strongly trusted nor met with disbelief. It is first of all market actors who are 
mistrusted. A survey question about changes in the food sector with regard to key food 
issues, like quality, price, safety, nutrition, and farming methods, also gave surprising 
results. The relative proportions of those who think that food has improved with regard to 
these issues are generally higher than those who think that the situation has deteriorated. 
One might interpret this as overall rather positive and optimistic views on the 
modernisation of the food sector. Price is subject to most worry, concentrated in the euro 
zone countries, followed by quality, especially in Italy and Portugal. Also surprisingly, 
safety is the issue for which people in these six countries were most optimistic (in 2002) 
with a majority of respondents thinking the situation at that time had improved in all 
countries. Searching for mechanisms behind widespread consumer distrust in food 
focussing only on safety might therefore be insufficient and even misleading. This 
relatively widespread optimism regarding the food sector was also found in a European 
survey on food and animal welfare, conducted in 2005 (Kjærnes and Lavik 2007).  
 
But when looking at the overall levels of trust, we find systematic differences between 
countries for these as well as other trust measures. The high-trust countries are, in 
particular, Great Britain, but even Denmark and Norway. Italy and Portugal generally 
display low levels of trust. Germany also represented a low-trust region in several 
respects. It is notable that socio-demographic variables generally have modest and quite 
inconsistent significance, compared to the national variations (Kjærnes et al. 2005)(Poppe 
and Kjærnes 2003).  These findings seem to redirect attention from media discourse on the 
extent and character of food risks and individual responses to those discourses towards 
wider issues connected with interrelations in the food market and public regulation.  
 
In spite of the large volume of studies on risk perception and trust in food, few conceptual 
tools are provided for analysing these larger social processes of variation and change in 
trust – as a condition and as an outcome. What is it that makes the British see their food 
institutions as so much more trustworthy than the Germans do? Why do Europeans seem 
so jumpy now? And why has that become politically urgent? Cognitive models are not 
developed to explore these kinds of questions. 
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4.2 Risk, individualisation and consumer politics – a hypothesis 
(article IV) 
Several authors have claimed that uncertainty and distrust are associated with new or 
(post-) modern conceptions of food dangers as ‘risks’, as captured in the much vaunted 
‘risk society’ hypothesis of Ulrich Beck (1992). He points to two major features of 
‘second modernity’: risk society and individualisation (Beck 1999; Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002; Beck et al. 2003). People, it is argued, are increasingly forced to take 
individual and personal responsibility for their everyday lives and life-time careers. This 
responsibility gives freedom, but it also represents pressures, dilemmas, frustrations and 
uncertainties. Structural constraints influence how individuals take on these 
responsibilities; lack of knowledge and insight, asymmetrical power relations and 
distribution of resources all affect their freedom of manoeuvre. These dilemmas and 
uncertainties appear in all areas of everyday life. Everyday activities such as buying and 
eating are part of a process of individualisation, allowing individual creativity and self-
fulfilment, but also, it is argued, producing insecurity and anxiety (Giddens 1991; 
Sulkunen 1997).  
 
Modern risks are typically difficult or impossible to estimate, with consequences that 
cannot be delimited in time and space. They result from human actions and decisions, 
rather than the external influence of nature, fate or divine forces. Risk society marks the 
end of both Nature and Tradition. Food processing and preparation have represented a way 
of handling the potential hazards but, in risk society, the handling of food will also be seen 
as introducing new ones. It is not difficult to find examples of food risks that are perceived 
as unintended side-effects of social development: mad cow disease is the outcome of 
improper industrial handling of fodder due to economic priorities; the rising incidence of 
salmonella is explained by larger production units and global trade; hazardous high fat 
diets are promoted by cheap fat from a subsidised and industrialised agriculture and 
manufacturing industry, genetic modification (GM) generally enhances the manufactured 
uncertainty of modern food, the list goes on and on.  
 
Beck’s theory is a general one aimed at understanding major processes of social change. 
Little attention has been paid to how such processes are embedded in more concrete 
institutional structures and interrelations within the area of food. But the ‘risk society’ 
thesis has formed an interpretative frame for understanding contemporary issues of 
distrust in food (Almås 1999; Breck 2000; Brown and Michael 2002; Michelsen 2001; 
Wandel and Bugge 1997). The increasingly complex and dynamic character of modern 
systems of food provisioning, knowledge production and regulation is frequently said to 
lead to unpredictability, fragmentation and contradictions, themselves core features of 
contemporary consumption (Busch 2000; Gabriel and Lang 1995).  
 
Giddens (1991) has directed attention to the interconnections between modern institutions 
and personal everyday life. Modern institutions are characterised by their dynamism, the 
degree to which they undercut traditional habits and customs, and their global impact. 
There is a dislocation in time and space which leads to what he characterises as ‘abstract’ 
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institutions. Because it is impossible for us to have direct knowledge and complete control 
of the process, we have to take chances. To be able to do that, we need to feel secure that 
the outcome will be acceptable. In complex systems trust is becoming more important and, 
at the same time, more difficult to obtain (Luhmann 1979). Trust is a medium of 
interaction with the abstract system which serves both to empty day-to-day life of its 
traditional content and to set up globalising influences (Giddens 1991, 3). But what does 
this mean in terms of trust and distrust in contemporary society? Giddens’ answer, which 
he shares with Beck, is reflexivity. Reflexivity is associated with the uncertainty which 
seems to characterise our lives today, where many aspects have suddenly become open, 
organised only in terms of ‘scenario thinking’ (Giddens 1994,184). Routines, and the basic 
trust that forms a condition for them, become less valid. We must instead evaluate each 
problem and its alternative solutions, one by one. We have no choice but to make choices. 
In such circumstances, risk (as a social product) and trust need to be analysed together. 
Thus, society is not only a ‘risk society’; it is also one in which mechanisms of trust are 
shifting. Trust has to be actively evaluated and sustained. In larger organisational contexts, 
active trust depends upon more institutional ‘opening out’, that is institutions arguing 
actively for their own trustworthiness (Kjærnes 1999).  
 
Although the theoretical approach may vary, many others have joined in this concern with 
people worrying over modern risks, often associated with food scares, on the one hand, 
and individual uncertainty and distrust, on the other. In particular, we find parallel ideas in 
the sociology of science and the ‘public understanding of science’. Wynne (1996; 2005) 
sees a repeated need among major institutional actors to reinvent new ‘public deficit’ 
modes. Risk assessment by experts is a crux to the conflicts and a major source of public 
concern and distrust (Hoffmann-Riem and Wynne 2002). From having been generally 
ignored, public concerns do get attention. But a simplification of scientific knowledge and 
downplaying of the ‘unknown unknowns’ is taking place which, rather than being 
comforting and pacifying, instead raises public scepticism. People are not necessarily risk 
obsessed and fear driven, incapable of handling ‘uncertainty’, individualist and atomized. 
Their scepticism is rather associated with performative issues, control of science, scientific 
contingencies and the handling of the unknowns. In order to overcome some of the distrust 
and suspicion, public or lay involvement is a key, thus making expertise more open, 
transparent and accountable to a wider audience (Gough et al. 2003). The recent media 
and political focus on risks seems to fit with contemporary notions of the individualised 
consumer in global (turbo) capitalism, ambivalently described as victimised and equipped 
with agency. Politically as well as theoretically, risk society has become almost 
synonymous with media attention, as exemplified in food scares.  
 
I will not deny that these highly diverse, sometimes clearly contradictory, contributions 
may point to significant features of contemporary society and its dealing with food 
consumption. But for the purpose of studying the changing regulation of food I have some 
additions and objections. First, uncertainty and disagreement over food is about more than 
health and environmental hazards (Fine 2002, 218). People may be sceptical about, or 
deceived with regard to, for example, quality and flavour, price, nutritional composition, 
as well as various aspects of production and distribution (such as animal welfare or child 
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labour). These issues may be “new”, like GM food or animal welfare, or quite well-
known, like fraud, salmonella or poor nutritional composition.  
 
Second, disproportionate attention is given to the hierarchical relations between 
individuals as lay people, on the one hand, and experts and science, on the other. This 
perspective overlooks basic interrelationships between markets, states and individuals in 
terms of divisions of labour, responsibility and power. It also overlooks the impacts of 
concrete institutionalisation, thus assuming more or less uniform processes of 
modernisation, varying mainly in pace. It is moreover a question whether these 
controversies reflect individual uncertainty and basically uncontrollable risk, or whether 
they instead indicate disagreement and disappointment over the quality of the food, the 
performance of food institutions and social justice. The assumption of a long-term trend 
towards greater uncertainty, conflict and distrust is not clear. It may be that after a period 
of rapid change, new institutional arrangements may provide legitimate solutions to 
conflicts of interest and power imbalances and find ways to handle the asymmetric 
information. Indeed, as described in chapter 3, historical records show that large-scale 
shifts in the food sector have often been accompanied by consumer distrust and activism, 
which in turn have resulted in new forms of organisation and regulation.  
 
Third, assumptions about contemporary consumption being individualised in a sense of 
becoming “de-socialised” and privatised and, at the same time, overloaded with 
responsibility, are problematic, especially as a fundament for understanding how current 
food consumption is regulated. The immediate question is whether this captures everyday 
practices in a time of growing complexity? In order to actively sustain trust, modern 
institutions may have to accept, even support, the turbulence following the ‘opening out’ 
and expressions of distrust. But for various reasons institutions may be just as likely to 
seek ways to avoid uncertainty, mishaps, and turbulence. 
 
This is of course not to say that changes are not taking place or to disregard problems 
associated with the pervasion of scientific knowledge and new technologies across the 
world as well as new structures of power in global capitalism. This is certainly of no less 
importance compared to a decade ago when several of these contributions were produced, 
including my own commentary in article IV. But the focus in current discourses seems 
somewhat redirected from being concerned mainly with the problems of risk and 
individual uncertainty towards more emphasis on consumers and their agency. My point 
here is that we should problematise the issues of worry as well as how they apply to 
regulation and to people as consumers. 
4.3 Sources of trust in food (article V) 
Referring to a broad sociological tradition, Misztal (1995) claims that trust is inherently 
social, a collective orientation and structuring social life. Following from that, the 
formation of trust requires shared and relatively stable norms within society. In this vein, 
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trust in institutions may be regarded as an extension of interpersonal trust, projected onto 
political institutions and therefore conditioning the assessment of political performance 
(Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 1999). To say that trust is social is to emphasise 
shared norms and expectations, the predictability of cooperation and the constitution of 
everyday practices. A basic condition of trust is its emergence from, and embeddedness in, 
processes of institutionalisation. Referring to Bourdieu, Misztal has characterised an 
aspect of trust as habitus: ‘Trust as habitus is a protective mechanism relying on everyday 
routines, stable reputations and tacit memories, which together push out of modern life 
fear and uncertainty as well as moral problems.’ (Misztal, 1995, 102)  Trust then becomes 
part of the taken-for-grantedness that characterises many of our daily practices. This is not 
necessarily ‘blind trust’ – trust that is without any foundation, because trust is typically 
being confirmed by experiences and the normative and institutional framing of the 
practices. It makes sense to say that the establishment of flexible, but predictable everyday 
routines of buying, preparing and eating food require trust, while trust is also generated 
within such routines (Seligman 1997). But then distrust may easily signify a break-up of 
routines, a lack of social cohesion and community (re Putnam and others), suggesting a 
situation of ‘gastro-anomie’ (re Fischler 1988) or chaos (Elster 1989). At a national level, 
the levels of trust and distrust will reflect degrees of social cohesion. 
 
As opposed to theories of trust emphasizing norms, habits and social networks, which 
Mishler and Rose (2001) call ‘cultural’ theories, so-called ‘institutional’ theories propose 
that trust is derived from institutional and political performance. Trust hinges on citizen 
evaluations of institutional performance. Institutions that perform well generate trust, 
while those that perform badly generate scepticism and distrust. Trust in institutions is 
rationally based, and most contributions within this tradition seem to be founded within a 
rational choice perspective, thus emphasizing the role of rational calculation of self-
interest (Coleman 1990; Mishler and Rose 2001; Rothstein 2000; Sztompka 1999). 
National variations in trust are being associated with judgements about the performance of 
particular institutions (typically measured as economic performance or degrees of 
transparency/levels of corruption), either as an aggregate output or as individual 
experiences.  
 
Trust links citizens to regulatory bodies that are intended to govern on their behalf, and 
thereby enhances the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance (Hardin 2001). But this 
does not imply that political distrust necessarily has the opposite effect. Scepticism is 
assumed to have a constructive role in democratic processes, in the sense of requiring 
sufficient evidence or reasons for trusting (Braithwaite 1998). The conditional character of 
citizens’ trust may be accepted as a part of a legitimate democratic framework, and does 
not necessarily contest governance. People should question the performance of politicians 
and governmental bodies, and a healthy scepticism is a prerequisite to democracy 
(Sztompka, 1999). But scepticism which gives way to distrust can also be subversive to 
governance. Where distrust affects the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements, 
governance itself becomes contested. Trust can make extensive organisational control 
mechanisms redundant and distrust may become a problem for governance when it for 
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example leads to non-productive increase in government regulations as a means of 
building or regaining trust (Majone 1999).  
 
Cultural and institutional theories are often presented as mutually exclusive explanations 
of trust, but their opposition should not be exaggerated, as indicated by the varying roles 
of distrust. Some empirical studies suggest that while cultural explanations may be 
important under stable conditions marked by general consensus about values and 
solutions, explanations related to the performance of specific institutions are needed for an 
understanding of trust under conditions of turbulence and social change (Guseva and 
Rona-Tas 2001; Völker and Flap 2001). But even under more stable conditions, 
evaluations of performance cannot be seen only as a rational consideration of self-interest. 
There are variations across sectors and countries that suggest considerable path 
dependency, where institutional performance is part of a comprehensive, dynamic process 
embedded in a cultural and historical setting (Rothstein, 2000). According to Rothstein, 
structural and cultural frames influence both how institutional actors operate and how 
people relate to and react upon them and these processes may be mutually reinforcing. 
 
A multi-variate analysis of trust in food (the safety of meat) based on the TRUSTINFOOD 
data lends support to this (Kjærnes et al 2006) . Interpersonal trust and general confidence 
in food as well as more immediate judgements about institutional actors and changes in 
the food sector are not mutually exclusive, but add up to explain variations in trust in food. 
But while basic confidence matters more in the peaceful Denmark, trust seems more 
conditioned by the performance of food institutions in the United Kingdom, a country 
having experienced much more turbulence around food in recent years. West Germans’ 
strong scepticism rests equally strongly upon their judgements about the food sector. The 
low trust in Italy, Portugal and East Germany appears to contain basic, cultural elements 
as well as concrete scepticism towards institutional actors. The Norwegian high trust 
seemed to hinge on cultural as well as performative influences.  
 
It would seem, therefore, that it is necessary to consider both socially formed habits and 
organisational performance in order to understand the social sources of trust in food 
(Kjærnes et al. 2006). In both instances trust is mediated through other actors and within a 
political context. But how can people trust, considering the large and growing imbalances 
of knowledge and power?  Ongoing changes in the European food sector have features 
that may both strengthen and challenge the foundations of trust. Integration, management 
systems, and technological innovations can improve predictability and efficiency, thus 
supplying foods at a lower price, of a predictable quality, in a wider selection, and with 
lower risks of unintended (but known) safety hazards. On the other hand, many of the 
changes imply shifts in power and distribution of responsibilities, such as integration of 
markets down the food chain, more concentrated ownership structures, global sourcing, 
etc. (Harvey and Randles 2002; Lyon 1998; Busch 2000) The complexities of 
technologies and provisioning systems pose problems of understanding, such that 
consumers may not be convinced that their interests are sufficiently protected. 
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Judging food providers trustworthy seems to require shared, or at least clear, norms and 
expectations, as well as confidence in the ability and competence of food providers to 
meet those expectations. This is not simply a matter of knowledge and information, but is 
as much based on a reliable and accountable delegation of practical control. The social 
division of responsibilities is a key feature of any set of impersonal trust relations, which 
also must match the actual division of labour, and their fulfilment in practice. Where this 
occurs one will expect non-reflective reproduction of trust which delivers, relatively 
efficiently, other benefits too. Failing performance and mismatches, by contrast, may lead 
to trust being questioned.  
 
Many ongoing controversies in the area of food are associated with the legitimacy of 
divisions of responsibility and control. In connection to that we have seen a proliferation 
of public and private systems of quality and safety assurance, independent audit systems, 
traceability and transparency schemes, and new forms of consumer representation (Busch 
2000; Jacobsen and Kjærnes 2003; Lyon 1998). These are not merely there out of liability 
concerns, but represent institutional solutions to keep imbalances of power, interests, and 
information in check (re the opinions about the truth-telling of various types of actors). 
Their independent authority is therefore crucial, independence first of all from commercial 
considerations, but increasingly also from political strategic influences. In more general 
terms, they may be characterised as ‘institutionalisation of distrust’ (Braithwaite 1998; 
Luhmann 1979), a crucial part of many contemporary regulatory strategies within the area 
of food. It must be emphasised that this may not be an even, predictable or consensual 
process. To the contrary, changes and institutional responses depend on the institutional 
field, its built-in tensions and its capability of handling conflicts and new problems. We 
can expect negotiations and balancing of values, interests and responsibilities to be 
handled very differently across settings. Ultimately, this is not only a question of defining 
and framing food issues, but about control over food, and how people’s lack of control 
(qua consumer or citizen) is handled institutionally when conditions change. 
4.4 Complex relationships, emergent trust and distrust 
Countries differ, not only when it comes to popular trust, but also with regard to market 
and political responses (Bergeaud-Blackler and Ferretti 2006; Domingues 2006; Ferretti 
and Magaudda 2006; Halkier and Holm 2006; Lenz 2006; Nielsen 2006; Terragni 2006; 
Wales et al. 2006). Some underlying common principles of variation can be identified 
which refer to institutionalised interrelationships (for further documentation of the 
analysis, see Kjærnes et al. 2007). At the crudest level, high trust, even of different kinds, 
is seen to be a consequence of a ‘positive fit’ of relationships; and low trust is generated 
by a ‘negative fit’. Despite their differences, Norway and the United Kingdom share the 
characteristic of strong alignment between state regulation and market provisioning, 
producing a ‘positive fit’.  The one is closed, protectionist, and with a producer-dominated 
provisioning system; the other has supply chain integrated control, an open system, and 
centralised regulation. Norway has largely retained a post-war, standardised and national 
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culture of food, protected by a paternalist welfare state. The United Kingdom has 
witnessed rapidly extending globalisation of provisioning, an opening up and 
transformation of mass-food quality, with a regulatory system that adapted quite 
fundamentally to an extreme crisis symptomatic of modernisation. There, a ratcheting up 
of consumer norms and expectations, both with respect to provisioning and regulation, has 
to an extent been met by state and market actors. Perhaps the most important conclusion, 
therefore, is that trust in food involves much more than attainment of some putative 
standard of good or bad food. Different types of relationship, between different types of 
consumers, provisioners, and state authorities generate different expectations and very 
different alignments of trust.  
 
In a parallel manner, the high levels of distrust in Italy cannot be allocated to simple 
regrets of the passing of a nostalgically cosy familiar past. Instead we find failures to cope 
with conflicts of norms and standards between modernising tendencies and attachments to 
local and regional, small-scale consumption and provisioning. And the state is as much 
part of the problem as part of the solution. These diverse patterns were repeated in late 
2005 when the threat of avian flu caused significant drops in poultry sales in Italy and 
Germany, much less in the United Kingdom and hardly any in Norway.  
 
The intertwining of different tempos of change has led to more disruption of relationships 
and their embedded norms and expectations in some countries than others. Norway has 
been relatively insulated from scandals and has a slow pace of institutional change, 
whether of consumer habits, provisioning systems or state regulation. The United 
Kingdom has witnessed quite rapid institutional change, in terms of changing consumer 
habits and provisioning systems, and the BSE scandal finally triggered a radical and rapid 
change in regulatory systems. In Italy both the immediate threats from ‘crises’ of various 
kinds, and the longer term institutional shifts intertwine to maximise disruption of shared 
norms and expectations – if ever such a state of ‘positive fit’ existed in post-war Italy. And 
finally, Germany has witnessed some fairly rapid institutional responses to immediate 
crises, but not in a direction consistent with longer term shifts in consumption habits and 
provisioning systems. This produces a situation of positively conflictual, rather than 
merely disrupted, norms and expectations. Clearly, this interpretation can only be 
speculative. But viewed from a relational perspective, trust and distrust are about profound 
institutional change and immediate events, crises and scandals.  
 
This account challenges any simplistic dualism of state versus market, of regulation and 
deregulation. There is very little empirical evidence that can support a view of the Anglo-
Saxon model as one of ‘free markets’, as against a continental European social state 
model. Rather, there are different types of concordance or discordance between different 
types of regulatory frameworks and market provisioning systems. All food provisioning 
systems, as markets, are highly regulated, at national, European and world trade levels. 
The contrasts are firstly between the way that different regulatory systems meet and match 
the organisation of provisioning systems and the ways in which these institutions consider 
and involve people’s expectations and reactions. It is significant that new regulatory 
regimes of traceability from farm to fork and hazards critical point analysis is paralleled 
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by the types of control over production and distribution manifest in integrated supply 
chains. Secondly, there are variations both in levels of market coherence and conflict, and 
in efficiency, transparency and coherence within state regulatory authorities. Some 
governments have struggled to implement regulatory frameworks in a uniform way across 
the provisioning systems, themselves often fragmented and very diverse within a given 
country. This is another source of conflict and tension between regulatory systems and 
provisioning systems, or simply a lack of efficiency, transparency and coherence in 
regulation. There are wide variations in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ relationships. 
 
Various configurations therefore differ in their ability to tackle problems and to restore 
trust. Clarity, consensus and transparency seem to be ways of stopping scandals turning to 
crises; and concealment and deception on the part of authorities seem to be worst case 
scenarios. It must be emphasised, however, that conditions for trust also have important 
slow-changing, path-dependent elements. Configurations are mostly at least temporarily 
stable. Nevertheless, they are still subject to change, and may sometimes be destabilised 
quickly, as in the British case. However, in the UK a new accommodation between 
producers and regulation re-established significant degrees of trust within a few years, at 
least with regard to food safety.  
 
Trust does not necessarily seem to hinge on active consumer involvement. Whereas trust 
in Norway seems to rely comfortably on social cohesion, consensus and delegation of 
control, the British and German situations are more conditional. It is also in these 
countries that we find (somewhat) more consumer activism and, in the British case, more 
collective consumer representation. However, it is difficult to say whether this 
conditionality is a characteristic of the emerging new forms of regulation or whether it is 
instead typical of changing relationships and that institutionalisation, if efficient and 




5.1 Shifts in the regulation of food consumption 
The activities of providing, preparing and eating food have constituted arenas for 
regulation since ancient times. Many have argued that new forms of regulation are 
emerging, emphasising individuals’ freedom as well as responsibilities. I have tried to 
characterise some aspects of contemporary regulation of food consumption, asking 
whether they represent distinctively new forms. I have also questioned people’s responses 
- as eaters, buyers and citizens.  
 
Patriarchal and status oriented forms of regulation, associated primarily with household 
centred food consumption, gave little freedom and responsibility to the individual. 
Industrial societies developed more efficient food distribution systems and as well as new 
notions of individual rights guaranteed by the nation state. Gradually, science (and good 
manners) took over from previous religious norms about good eating. New forms of 
regulation emerged, addressing people’s health and wellbeing captured in the notion of 
‘hygiene’; disciplining markets as well as families. Quests for regulation as well as 
enhanced governability were associated with a major restructuring of food provisioning 
systems, along with the emergence of a new type of family with a responsible and 
dedicated housewife. But this liberal system was a system with strong tensions related to 
social justice. The social democratic welfare state continued and extended most of the 
liberal regulation of food consumption but with new emphasis on universalism and the 
right to social welfare. The ‘pastoral’ welfare state made family life a central target for 
political action – as part of a moral project of “designing the good life”. This took place 
within a political regime concentrated on conflicts between capital and labour, with little 
agency allocated to the consumer role beyond the family sphere. But rather than being 
perceived as subversive, limiting individual freedom, the highly paternalistic efforts of 
disciplining eating were met by enthusiasm, as part of a collective liberating enterprise to 
build a national welfare society.  
 
Many have stated that societal change has made legalistic and disciplinary actions less 
relevant and less legitimate, suggesting that new forms of regulation have replace stated 
welfare with choice and individual responsibility. As part of this process people, in their 
capacity as ‘consumers', appear as subjects and are accorded agency in the politics of food 
consumption. Instead of addressing ‘choice’ as an analytical concept, I have argued that its 
popularity in public and political discourse reflects a distinctly new model of regulating 
food consumption. With its close association with markets, an economic vocabulary, and a 
focus on individual decision-making, it fits well with neo-liberalism in advanced post-
industrial societies. But ‘consumer choice’ is not just a direct implication of deregulation, 
marketisation and privatisation. Across Europe, we see that regulatory action is taken on 
the basis of such models. It becomes a mode of regulation emphasising individual self-
responsibility and a governance of mentalities. It is a moral type of regulation, making 
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people do the right thing by their own free will (Halkier 2004; Sulkunen et al. 2004). 
Active measures are taken by various social actors to make people become “choosing 
consumers”, that is people taking responsibility for the consequences of their own actions 
as consumers, individually and collectively. This is different from disciplinary actions, 
which, instead of making them choose the right thing, steer people in the right direction by 
educational and organisational efforts.  
 
Self governance, as a form of market regulation as well as regulation of consumption 
habits, emphasises voluntarism, autonomy and diversity – as opposed to state directives 
and disciplinary actions. It is, however, also about new divisions of responsibility and 
consumer obligations. The balance plays out quite differently depending on the type of 
issue and kinds of interrelations involved. New social problems are framed as “ethical 
choices”, such as issues related to sustainability and animal welfare (the ethics being 
contrasted to self interest). Many old issues have also become re-politicised. Nutrition, 
which has typically been characterised by relatively weak institutionalisation in Europe, 
seems to adapt to new forms of regulation by focussing on the manipulation of “food 
choice” as self responsibility and self (and market) governance. But when it comes to a 
strongly institutionalised and regulated issue like food safety, the significant regulatory 
changes have, relatively speaking, less emphasis on self-governance by individual 
consumers. Food safety risks are subject to re-regulation (with “government at a 
distance”), but the new consumer plays a different role, more as a stakeholder in policy 
formulation through deliberative processes. The consumer has here emerged more as a 
collective actor than being attributed individual responsibilities.  
 
For market regulation, governance at a distance has meant that enforcement rests more on 
market actors, but the formulation of standards as such may and often do involve other 
actors. New ways of influencing consumption habits, on the other hand, concentrate first 
and foremost on morally framed persuasion of individual consumers via education and 
campaigns initiated by a multiplicity of actors, as well as more indirect efforts, like state 
promoted market communication, research funding (and science based “dissemination”), 
or support to NGO activities. Added to that, regulation may aim at directing or facilitating 
consumer choice via non-communicative means. This is particularly evident in the ways in 
which state actions and other initiatives try to shape market differentiation, assurance and 
certification schemes, transparency initiatives, etc. in order to promote responsible 
‘consumer choice’. Product labelling is central. But, as we have seen in the studies of 
trust, shifts in market-state relationships may also be reflected in more focus on 
‘consumers’ in decision making and, following from that, conflicts on who represents this 
‘consumer’.  A legitimate collective consumer voice seems to be needed in stakeholder 
policy making forums and there are a number of efforts to facilitate or produce such a 
voice through various forms of consultations, lay panels, and citizen juries. In that way, 
reasonable and rational opinions are expected as an obligation of (people as) consumers 
not only individually but also collectively. Established political channels do not seem 
sufficient for that (Micheletti 2003). 
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Governmentality is based on representative discipline, order and hierarchy being 
internalised in self-discipline. This empowerment can be seen as a new layer upon a 
people that already accepts the state, king and police, but are too liberal and self-conscious 
to accept a direct order. But a repeated observation is that while people may be interested, 
engaged and concerned about a wide range of food issues, this is often not reflected in 
what they do (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006; Harrison et al. 2005). There is a lack of 
‘consistency’, ‘compliance’ or ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Mayfield et al. 2007). Standard 
answers are that this is either a matter of failing convictions or due to market related 
barriers, such as lack of information and availability or high prices. But people may be 
able and willing to take on new responsibilities or – put in another way – they wish to 
have a say. Actions characterised as ethical and political consumerism give support to that. 
Yet, consumer activism rarely emerges in isolation, but is commonly supported by public 
debates and collective mobilisation. Though appearing as individual choices, it is part of a 
social process: “Consumer individual action and collective activism, although arguably in 
conflict with market liberal theory, is here the ultimate ethical enforcer.” (Newholm 
2000). Individual analytical perspectives fail to catch such connections. 
 
I see the main problem of this form of regulation not in responsibility via choice as such 
(collectively and individually), but in the ways and degrees to which these strategic 
actions match institutional conditions, first of all in terms of autonomy and power. While 
choices may be voluntary in the sense that acting in opposition is not met by legal or 
disciplinary sanctions, they are not actions cut loose from their social context. We must 
consider the relationships between regulative and constitutive rules. Consumer actions 
take place within institutional field, with interrelations and dependencies that are not 
deterministic, but highly influential on what people wish and do when they buy, prepare 
and eat food. ‘Consumer choice’ is adapted to, or emerges from, institutional settings that 
are quite distinct in terms of households and family life as well as food provisioning and 
state action. If we look at how interrelations and habits are regulated, it has clearly not 
been a universal, perhaps not even a dominant mode of regulation of food consumption 
over the last decade. This is partly due to uneven and path-dependent regulatory change, 
institutional inertia, and resistance from powerful actors. The Norwegian studies 
demonstrate how a lack of change in mentalities does not emerge in isolation, but is 
strongly associated with stability in the institutional field in which regulation addresses 
everyday habits and their interlinkages with the provisioning system. 
 
Not only may the degrees of change be questioned, but even its directions. There are 
indications that ongoing institutional change does not predominantly point in a direction 
of informalisation. Across Europe, food consumption is becoming more and more 
dependent on interaction with formal institutions, as reflected in standardisation, 
integration and formalised procedures. This is also opening up opportunities to use 
disciplinary techniques – in public institutions as well as in private food services and 
shops. Moreover, recent controversies over food are associated with and partly outcomes 
of this formalisation, like struggles over standards and labelling. We might say that a 
regulatory policy of ‘consumer choice’ rests on stronger institutionalisation and 
formalisation, including individual as well as collective consumer agency and voice. 
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Where we find a lack of formalisation, like in the Norwegian example of sugar, habits as 
well as interaction with the provisioning system are also largely decoupled from 
regulatory processes. The institutional field within and with reference to which regulation 
can be established is too weak. 
5.2 Trust and its institutional foundations 
Throughout history food has been associated with repeated periods of contestation and 
social mobilisation, which have either been met with some kind of realignment (often re-
regulation) or through direct exercise of power to reinstate social order. However, until the 
1980s or even 1990s, tranquillity was not called ‘trust’, protest was not called ‘distrust’, 
and the protesting people were not called ‘consumers’. Gradually, problems and 
discontent became ‘concerns’, worries that perhaps reflected the new individualised 
understanding of the consumer role. Some time in the 1990s these individual concerns 
became reframed as problems of trust (notably not as distrust). This change of words is 
clearly not accidental, but seems linked to food regulation becoming more politicised, 
perhaps also consumer responses becoming more important to institutional actors.  
 
There are several ways to record distrust. Media attention, mobilisation and political 
turbulence are certainly important, especially since we have seen a reorientation in these 
debates towards consumers. This new focus has been helped by rapid shifts in demand, 
such as sudden drops in beef consumption following immediately after the news about 
BSE. But public opinion surveys have also come to represent important input, recording 
the extent of popular (or “consumer”) discontent. However, until the late 1980s, people 
were rarely asked about such issues, so we really do not know if such opinions of 
discontent have become more widespread. There are signs to the contrary, as trust in food 
safety policies appears to have improved over the last years, at least in some places. But 
we cannot say much about tendencies over time regarding risk and trust in food. What we 
can say is that such issues have become more urgent in politics as well as in the market. 
We also see that more people (in some places) take action as consumers – re political 
consumerism. It is within this dynamic, politicised context that I have analysed survey 
findings about variations in trust in food. 
 
The Europeanisation of the food market and food regulations is in this respect important, 
bringing up new issues and reconstructing old ones (Ansell and Vogel 2006). The process 
has not yet been settled in terms of relations between institutional actors and ordinary 
people. The role as consumer seems to have become a key point, not only because people 
are affected as buyers and eaters, but also because this has become a relevant arena for 
response. The larger and more integrated the sellers become, the more will they be 
affected by mismanagement and bad reputation. Vulnerability to public criticism is 
increasingly sensitised and even small drops in demand (even only for a short period) may 
cause concern. The confidence of the public becomes more critical, its distrust more 
consequential. Notably, however, responses of distrust refer to politics and market 
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conditions, while science and new technologies do not appear central per se. Scientists are 
definitely important, but their role seems to a large degree to depend on the relationships 
they have with those controlling the food, i.e. public authorities and market actors, and the 
trust that people have in these institutions. As independent actors, trust in them is 
generally high (see also Niva 2008). 
 
There is therefore a sense in which in recent years a more critical public has emerged 
whose trust in food has become more conditional. In response to this situation, we have 
seen what may be called an intensification of ‘processes of reassurance’ (Kjærnes et al. 
2007). Corporations and states feel impelled to institute new procedures which 
acknowledge that consumers might sometimes have grounds for disquiet, that their trust 
should not be expected to be unconditional. New institutional arrangements have been 
developed which accept that distrust may in certain circumstances be appropriate and 
rational. There need to be ways in which consumers can be reassured that they are not 
subject to malfeasance, misinformation or other forms of mischief on the part of powerful 
actors. This reassurance response is one of institutionalising distrust. In the ten years or so 
after 1990 legitimacy problems related to food were pressing. The framing as a British and 
a European problem of consumer trust was new, requiring urgent action. But it also gave 
the European Union more freedom to act and to formulate new solutions. They included 
key elements like the recognition of consumer concerns for safety, as well as 
organisational issues of accountability, transparency and independence. And, gradually, 
the problems have receded from the newspaper front pages. 
 
In that way, the European and, especially, the British events cannot be explained merely as 
the restoration of confidence and re-establishment of the status quo through successful 
social engineering. The consumer has come to stand in a somewhat different relation to 
powerful economic and political actors. Institutional means to handle conditionality and 
instability have become necessary to the reproduction of trust. Distrust does not only 
represent absence of confidence. Rather there are signs of distrust coming to represent a 
relevant, dynamic and active option for expressing discontent, feedback and influence on 
institutional conditions. This distrust is not occasioned by individuals becoming more 
reflexive. The analysis points to ‘fits’ and ‘misfits’ between socially institutionalised 
actors. As a consequence, we should focus on how particular and new societal and 
institutional configurations of relationships between key actors emerge. Consumer protest 
is not a new phenomenon, but widespread awareness of a legitimate consumer role or 
agency is. It does indicate that people are thought to be more self-conscious and willing to 
become more responsible as consumers. But that cannot happen if they do not have the 
relevant options to act in the market or the necessary channels to express their voice, or if 
decision-makers disregard their opinions as ‘stupid’ or ‘irrational’.  One cannot expect an 
active and responsible consumer role to emerge without disturbance, conflict and 
uncertainty among institutional actors. Above all, this is a matter of questioning the 
distribution of power, and its expression in institutional arrangements. This is not 
attributed to circumstances where consumer power has grown relative to other major 
actors – this is nowhere demonstrably the case – but to a realignment of the distribution of 
power. Thus, acknowledgement and anticipation of consumer demands (or fear of 
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consumer reactions) by the major actors, state and market, have had consequences for the 
recent re-organisation of the food system in Europe, both in regulatory arrangements and 
in the market. 
5.3 Regulation and power 
Building on the historical as well as the comparative studies, two major dimensions 
emerge regarding ongoing regulatory change. The first is the degree of freedom and 
autonomy that is accorded to and taken by the individual as a consumer, politically and in 
everyday habits. The second dimension addresses market and regulatory conditions, 
reflecting the degree and scale of organisation and formalisation of food provisioning (and 
thus also the division of labour with food as well as regulatory arrangements). It is not 
difficult to see that a ‘welfare state approach’ may be characterised as low individual 
freedom combined with highly developed and trusted institutional structures centred on 
nation state responsibility for solving social problems. Similarly, an approach involving 
‘consumer choice’ is based on highly organised and formalised solutions within a context 
of complex, globalised markets, but it is combined with strong emphasis on individual 
freedom – a responsible ‘choice’. Compared to the de-commodification emphasis of the 
welfare state approach, commodification is here central. Contrasted to both of these highly 
organised and formalised forms, however, there are also situations in which the 
institutionalisation is less formalised, thus forming very different kinds of interrelations 
and contexts for regulatory efforts. The studies of trust indicate that parts of Europe, in the 
south and sometimes in the east, have less reliance on and attention towards large-scale 
institutional procedures, which are also less trusted. Instead, favoured cooperation and 
trust tend to refer to local networks and familiarity based interrelations with less 
imbalance of power. This is paralleled by differences also in the form of consumer 
involvement. Work with food is more household centred and relations are influenced by 
loyalty to particular providers or places. Such relations are easily characterised as 
traditional and to some degree they probably are. But in Europe they also point to local 
responses to situations of widespread institutional distrust. 
 
However, the two dimensions opens to a fourth position, namely initiatives with low 
degrees of organisation and formalisation combined with high individual freedom. This 
may reflect what has been described as ‘communitarianism’ and thus important for 
understanding the emergence of new forms of self-regulation. As such, they must be based 
on characteristic supplier-consumer relations, with less imbalances of power and 
information, compared to conventional solutions, and more emphasis on the mutuality of 
norms and well as obligations. Importantly however, compared to “traditional” networks, 
the mutuality does not take away their individual and voluntary character. Participation is 
based on inner convictions and motivations regarding values and causes rather than 
multiple bonds and social sanctions – these are “weak ties”. While this is not evident as 
dominant strategies at a macro level (like in the cross-country comparisons presented 
here), this seems to be a type of (self-) regulation that characterise initiatives such as 
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farmers’ markets, Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), cooperative shops, etc. Such 
initiatives constitute very small proportions of food distribution, but they seem to 
represent an important form of activism in which consumers are involved and also a 
source of innovation in modern food provisioning (e.g. as ecological modernisation) 
(Morgan et al. 2006). Typically, however, these types of relations and their sharing of 
responsibilities will however only work within small-scale settings. Paradoxically, success 
may therefore challenge their foundations and basic ideas. A well-known example is the 
development in the organic food market, which in many places has shifted from 
communitarian innovation to commercialisation, standardisation, and market regulation 
(‘conventionalisation’) (Guthman 2004; Sonnino and Marsden 2006). Similar tendencies 
can be observed even for farmers’ markets. Scaling up and accompanying 
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Table 1. Types of regulation - different solutions and consumer roles 
Table 1 indicates how the various types of regulation emerge from combining the two 
dimensions. The traditional approach is based on particularism, with low degrees of 
institutionalisation, but also low degrees of individual freedom, where familiarity and 
social control in small networks are central features. The welfare state approach is, on the 
contrary, based on universalism and equality, with far-reaching forms of 
institutionalisation. But there is even here little space for individual freedom and choice, 
emphasising instead collective decisions and political solutions. Moving then to the 
consumer choice approach, where commodification is an important way of solving social 
problems, we find emphasis on individual freedom as a choice between commercial 
alternatives. Institutionalisation is represented by large, often globalised, corporations. 
Liberal ideals of competition and choice will generally include state action, but 
involvement is in most cases meant to support market based distribution, rather than 
counteracting the effects of it. The fourth type of approach, characterised as 
‘communitarianism’, indicates voluntary actions where people as consumers and citizens 
are involved in small-scale, alternative initiatives with reference to immediate wishes of 
better food as well as more altruistic ideals. It is a form of self-regulation, but with very 
different institutional foundations. 
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Increasing degrees of organisation and formalisation will, in relation to households and 
people as consumers, mean growing imbalances of power. This makes the questions of 
‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’ pertinent. I have described how individual freedom and 
responsibility will to a large degree depend on the ways in which organisational structures 
are set up and how they are configured (the institutional field). While organisational 
resources may represent discipline and abuses of power (including exploitation of 
consumer loyalty) and thus struggles for ‘freedom from’, organisation can also, to the 
consumer, provide higher predictability, systems to deal with malfeasance, and efficiency 
which may provide ‘freedom to’. The welfare state and the neo-liberal state have very 
different types of solutions. The welfare state solution is based on (national) 
egalitarianism, paternalism and discipline (of the market as well as households). 
Individualisation and self-regulation may represent a regulatory response not only to a 
declining legitimacy of this kind of interventionism, but also increasing organisational 
complexity. This is reflected in large-scale re-regulation of markets as well as in 
relationships with households and consumers. Individualisation of responsibility is to the 
consumer not a matter of the number of choices that are presented on the shelves, but how 
choice as a form of consumer based involvement is institutionalised. It is recognition of 
people as “end-consumers”, as social actors, with systems of empowerment politically as 
well as via the provisioning system. ‘Consumer choice’ as a regulatory strategy includes 
not only communicative efforts to make people into “choosing consumers”, but also the 
provision of institutions which recognise consumer interests and agency 
(institutionalisation of distrust). When this is lacking we find distrust as representing 
powerlessness. Individual responsibility-taking represents agency and is not always a 
matter of loyal support to shared goals, but involves protest and creativity. Communitarian 
initiatives may be an indication of that, where self-realisation is intimately combined with 
responsibility for social problems (‘power to’). But as solutions to counteract existing 
imbalances of power in the food market the impacts of such initiatives are probably more 
as part of consumer mobilisation and politicisation than as alternative provisioning. 
 
It is easy to sympathise with the claims that consumer concerns must be taken seriously 
and that proper channels for feedback and influence should be ensured. Such channels are 
often poorly developed in Europe today. It is also understandable that requesting 
consumer responsibility without empowerment is problematic. Demands of consumer 
responsibility are often coming from other societal actors. Such demands may sometimes 
be in accordance with the expectations of modern consumers. Korthals (2001) has argued 
that shopping considering caring and ethical concerns challenges the distinctions between 
the consumer role and the citizen role. ‘Political consumerism’ as a form of political 
activism points in the same direction (Micheletti 2003). In my opinion, this is not only a 
matter of value orientations or public discourse. Values and debates develop within 
particular social settings; in everyday life, markets and politics. The ways in which 
consumption is institutionalised - the daily routines, the directions and priorities of food 
consumption, as well as the responsibility, power and resources of ‘the consumer’ – are 
not static preconditions. Assuming agency without considering concrete arrangements, 
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power structures, and trust relations may end up being moralising rather than mobilising. 
There are numerous examples. 
 
‘Consumer choice’ is a highly politicised concept, emerging within a historical and spatial 
context of ample supplies and sufficient incomes. It denotes a particular type of action and 
particular forms of interaction. Consumer choice combines ideas of freedom and 
responsibility. Making use of animal welfare to differentiate and “milk” segments with 
high purchasing power does not necessarily promote consumer activism – nor the welfare 
of farm animals. Yet, well developed, integrated and predictable markets form the 
background for the emergence of this type of regulation, which typically involves 
elements of politicisation and mobilisation as well as state efforts to encourage and sustain 
the “right” choices. Still, due to the historical contingency of such contexts, freedom and 
responsibility do not take the same forms everywhere, nor is it universally successful. On 
the contrary, as a governing principle within the area of food consumption, ‘consumer 
choice’ is of relatively limited significance. But, where it has succeeded, empowerment 
and agency are important characteristics; it cannot be reduced to ‘self regulated markets’. 
Likewise, lacks of success should not be reduced to ‘gastro-anomie’ or lack of 
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Article I.  
 
Jensen, T. Ø., and U. Kjærnes. 1997. "Designing the good life: nutrition and social 
democracy in Norway." In Constructing the New Consumer Society, ed. P. Sulkunen, J. 
Holmwood, H. Radner and G. Schulze. Houndmills, Hampshire and London: Macmillan 
Press. 
Abstract 
This paper presents a study of the emergence of nutrition policy within the Norwegian 
welfare state. Emphasis is put on how nutrition in the inter-war period came to be 
reformulated from elitist discipline into a collective, liberating project. Three aspects are 
of particular importance: belief in scientifically based state intervention, corporative forms 
of governance, and the emphasis on disciplinary forms of regulation to increase welfare 
for all. Together, scientific planning and patriotic corporatism signalled a long period of 
strong interventionist and protectionist policies in the food sector. This centralised multi-
sectorial state regulation implied special forms of interrelations and moral considerations, 
where nutritional concerns became interwoven with other concerns of strong national 
importance, such as economic support to agricultural production and rural communities 
and reduced social inequality. The paper shows how modernisation within and with 
reference to these forms of institutionalisation provided powerful solutions and legitimacy, 
but also significant tensions and limitations. Consumers became politically completely 
marginalised. Rights to protection dominated over private freedoms or responsibilities, 
with little hesitation over state regulation of markets and the family for the “common 
good”. The case emphasises the importance of historical legacy and institutional path-
dependency for understanding how regulations of food consumption evolve and become 




Article II.  
 
Kjærnes, U. and R. Døving (forthcoming) “Governing meals in the Norwegian welfare 
state: regulation and institutionalisation.” Submitted to Journal of Consumer Culture.  
Abstract 
Many assume that current regulatory influences on consumption are dominated by 
individualised responsibilities and commercial solutions. This paper examines this 
assumption, discussing how the regulation of food consumption in Norway has changed in 
a complex interaction between regulatory strategies and institutional structures. The 
packed lunch introduced in the inter-war period is an example of explicit social 
engineering succeeding in becoming socialised and internalised into an institution that has 
survived until today. The contrasting handling of fat and sugar shows how structural 
influences do not disappear when eventually more freedom and responsibility were 
allocated to the individual. The regulation of food consumption may have very powerful 
effects on what people eat when in accordance with important cultural and normative 
references and organisational structures and much less – or in unexpected directions – 
when this is not the case. These effects are particulary strong within the Norwegian 





Article III.  
 
Kjærnes, U. 2006. "Trust and distrust: cognitive decisions or social relations?" Journal of 
Risk Research 9 (8):911-32.  
Abstract 
The issue of consumer trust has repeatedly been raise in relation to food policy events in 
Europe over the last couple of decades. Based on the project ’Consumer Trust in Food’ 
(funded bye the European Commission, contract no. QLK1-CT-2001-00291), the paper 
discusses explanations to variations and changes in trust. Representative population 
surveys were conducted in Denmark, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Norway and Portugal. 
Opinions on trust in food show large and consistent differneces across the countries. 
While trust is high in Great Britain and Scandinavia, levels are generally much lower in 
Italy, Portugal and Germany. It may seem as if the considerable regulatory and market-
based reforms that came in the aftermath of the BSE crisis have had positive impacts on 
trust. But trust is based even on other issues than food safety, and people are generally 
more sceptical when it comes to ethical issues, quality or nutrition. It is argued that 
cognitive models, focussing on individual risk perception and communication, are 
insufficient to explain these variations. An alternative approach is outlined, where 
consumer trust is understood as organisational frames. By considering food consumption 
as the outcome of complex interrealtions between consumers, the market, the state, and 
civil society, we can identify characteristically different types of conditions for trust. Trust 
seems to refer not only to shared norms and expectations, but also to the concrete 
organisation and performance of food institutions, redarding predictability, openness, etc. 
It is a matter of both organisations’ capability and willingness to meet expectations. 
Historical and cultural conditions as well as rapid shifts may lead to discrepancies between 
expectations and performance – which may be expressed as distrust – politically and in the 
market. It is therefore suggested that institutionalising consumer distrust may represent 
and important way of building trust in modern food institutions.  
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Article IV.  
 
Kjærnes, U. 1999. "Food risks and trust relations." Sosiologisk tidsskrift 7 (4):265-84.  
Abstract 
There is an increased focus on trust in food. While today’s consumers may have become 
somewhat more attentive and demanding, the main point is that trust in the food system in 
itself has become more significant – and, thereby, so have the mechanisms that direct trust 
and distrust. Using Norwegian examples, the article focuses on structural changes that 
have contributed to this situation: liberalisation of trade, increased competition, and shifts 
of power in the food system, together with rapidly growing organisational and 
technological complexity. Our daily encounters with food are important for individual 
identity and safety, at the same time as they are dependent on highly complex social 
institutions. Dynamic trust seems to be essential, allowing us to shift between 
straightforward routines, based on simple symbols and classifications, and a more active 
state of reflexivity on what we are doing and what is taking place in the market. A 
precondition is the establishment of robust and effective channels for expressing distrust, 
preferably in the forms of third-party control and public concern. One major issue is the 
transparency of decision-making in the market and within these control bodies. While 
established commercial actors benefit from strategies that can promote the status quo, 
which is dominated by closed decisions and routine consumer purchases, this is 
challenged by new supply-side actors, consumer groups, the media, etc. The various actors 
in the food system have a range of alternative strategies for responding to distrust. The 
combination of these strategies and their relation to other efforts that may reduce the 
pressure on consumer trust – or alternatively distrust – are worthy of attention, particularly 
in empirical studies of the role of trust. 
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Article V.  
 
Kjærnes, U., C. Poppe, and A. Dulsrud. 2006. ”Contestation over food safety: The 
significance of consumer trust.” In Why the Beef? The Contested Governance of 
European Food Safety Regulation, ed. C.V. Ansell and D. Vogel. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press 
Abstract 
Many claim that trust rests on taken for granted habits, norms and basic social networks, 
often developed as part of early socialisation. As opposed to these ‘cultural’ theories, so-
called ‘institutional’ theories propose that trust is derived from institutional and political 
performance. While distrust from the first kind of perspective often signifies a break-up of 
routines and a lack of social cohesion and community, and institutional perspective opens 
for a more constructive role of distrust as part of democratic processes. Based on data 
collected in representative population surveys in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Norway, and Portugal in 2002, we explore the importance of these two types of 
explanations to variations in trust in the safety of food items. The levels of trust vary 
significantly between the countries, with Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries 
representing high-trust areas, while low levels of trust are found in Germany, Italy and 
Portugal. Two regression models were introduced to study influences on trust within each 
country, one including variables taken to indicate social and cultural influences (trust in 
other people, confidence in own food), a second one adding variables indicating 
judgements of performance (trust in the truth-telling of institutional actors, 
optimism/pessimism regarding change in the food sector). Generally, we find that both 
types of variables help to explain variations in trust, but the patterns are quite varied across 
the six countries. While the high trust in Denmark hinges on cultural explanations and on 
institutional explanations in Great Britain, we find both types of influences in Norway. 
Institutional explanations are significant in all three low-trust countries, but while this 
seems to be the main type of influence in Germany, social and cultural influences matter 
as well in Italy and Portugal. In view of ongoing modernisation of the European food 
sector, it is evident that changes are experienced and trusted very differently across 
various countries, seeming influenced not only by culturally and socially contingent 
expectations but also on how states and markets take on board and handle structural and 
regulatory change. This latter, ‘institutional’, factor is particularly important for 
understanding responses of distrust. 
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